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Doctrinal Conflict in Foreign Investment Regulation in India: NTT Docomo vs. Tata 
Sons and the Case for “Downside Protection” 
 
M P Ram Mohan*, Nobuhisa Ishizuka** & Sidharth Sharma 
 
Abstract: 
The strategic importance of India as an investment destination for foreign investors is 
highlighted by ongoing tensions in the Indo-Pacific region, and the recognition that a strong 
economic relationship with India is in the interests of countries seeking a more stable balance 
of power in the region.  From a policy perspective, India has struggled to balance its own 
economic interests with the commercial requirements of investors.  Rules attempting to strike 
this balance have created uncertainties that have resulted in investors seeking greater 
protections, which in turn have triggered additional regulatory responses.  The prevalent use 
of put options by foreign investors, whereby Indian parties are required to buy out their 
counterparties at pre-determined prices, has been a prominent subject of these regulations.  
India’s judiciary has been drawn into this cycle through actions brought by foreign investors 
seeking to enforce arbitration awards validating their exit rights. In the process, they have 
created their own interpretation of the applicability of foreign investment rules that support 
principles of freedom of contract.  This doctrinal conflict with regulatory policy is illustrated 
by a high-profile dispute involving one of Japan’s largest and most well-known companies, 
NTT Docomo, and one of India’s largest and most trusted companies, Tata Sons.  Japan views 
India as a key strategic partner and in particular, views strong economic ties as a central 
linchpin of the partnership.  Using, principally, the Docomo-Tata case as an example, and a 
review of other similar disputes, this paper analyses the regulatory and judicial doctrines that 
have shaped foreign investment regulation in India and explores the public policy implications 
of the conflict for India.  In doing so, it proposes regulatory reforms to provide more clarity 
and certainty for investors, suggesting that express recognition of “downside protection” for 
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The key objective of the Government of India’s foreign direct investment (FDI) policy is to 
make it transparent, predictable, and easily comprehensible.1 These features are crucial to 
increase and maintain investor confidence in the Indian market. As of 2019, India attracted net 
FDI inflows of about USD 50 billion.2 Three countries, Mauritius, Singapore, and the United 
States of America account for over 50 percent of India’s FDI inflows.3 Despite the pandemic, 
India’s FDI inflows from the US have increased in the period between April and September 
2020 when compared to the period between April 2019 and March 2020.4 Japan’s percentage 
of total investment inflows to India over the same period is on par with that of the US at 7 
percent, making it the fifth largest investor by FDI equity inflows.5 Though the FDI policy 
clearly articulates the need to maintain a stable investment environment, there are portions of 
India’s regulatory framework that create uncertainty for foreign investors. This paper examines 
one such area of India’s regulatory landscape, namely, the treatment of foreign investors’ exit 
rights under foreign exchange regulation.  
 
A corporation investing abroad is subject to increased downside risk (the risk of incurring 
losses) compared to one which only invests domestically.6 The geographical distance of the 
investment and differences in language and culture between the country of the foreign investor 
and the country of the venture reduces an investor’s ability to effectively monitor their 
investment.7 This type of information asymmetry is a risk that is unique to foreign investment.8 
                                                        
1 Consolidated FDI Policy Circular, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, 5 (October 2020), 
https://dipp.gov.in/sites/default/files/FDI-PolicyCircular-2020-29October2020_0.pdf [Henceforth Consolidated 
FDI Policy]. The Consolidated FDI Policy is issued by the Government of India through its Department for the 
Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade.   The FDI Policy is a comprehensive document containing the 
conditions for eligible investors, sector-wise caps on foreign investment (where applicable) and the procedure 
for government approvals where they are required.  
2 Foreign direct investment, net inflows (BoP, current US$), THE WORLD BANK, 
HTTPS://DATA.WORLDBANK.ORG/INDICATOR/BX.KLT.DINV.CD.WD.  
3 Quarterly Fact Sheet, Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade, Ministry of Commence& 
Industry, 2 (September 2020), https://dipp.gov.in/sites/default/files/FDI_Fact_sheet_September_20.pdf.   
4 Id.  
5 Id. According to data from the Ministry of Finance, Japan, investment outflows from Japan into India in 2019 
amounted to about 553 Billion Yen. See Direct Investment Flows 2019, Ministry of Finance, Japan, 
https://www.mof.go.jp/english/international_policy/reference/balance_of_payments/ebpfdii.htm.  
6 Li-Hsun Wang et al., Foreign direct investment and downside risk: Evidence from Taiwan, PACIFIC BASIN-
FINANCE JOURNAL 1, 2 (2019). 
7 Id.  
8 Id.; Itay Goldstein & Assaf Razin, An information-based trade off between foreign direct investment and foreign 
portfolio investment, 70 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 271, 288 (2007) (concluding remarks on how 
FDI allows for more information regarding the control and management of the corporation when compared to 
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The management of a company also exercises lesser control over its foreign investments than 
domestic ones.9 This can either be a result of the same informational asymmetry that affects 
shareholders or due to a government’s foreign direct investment (FDI) policy. In India, the FDI 
policy requires investors to partner with domestic firms if they want to make investments in 
certain sectors within India.10 This is done by capping the level of foreign investment that an 
undertaking in India is allowed to accept.11  Even if the investment is not capped, some sectors 
such as air transport services and telecom services require government approval for foreign 
investment exceeding specified thresholds, for example, 49 percent.12 The lower level of direct 
control exercised by a foreign investor justifies measures to curb the extent of risk it is exposed 
to; these measures are referred to as “downside risk protection”.13  
 
An important downside risk protection measure is the put option which has become virtually 
ubiquitous in foreign investment agreements in India.14  At a basic level, put options provide a 
foreign investor with an exit mechanism by granting the foreign investor the right to sell its 
investment position (often held in the form of shares in the venture) to its partner in India. An 
exit mechanism, by way of a put option, may even be a necessity in those companies whose 
stocks are not publicly traded or where the foreign investor’s holding is illiquid and the demand 
for it is limited. However, put options are also used by foreign investors for protection against 
losses by imposing an obligation on the Indian partner to purchase shares at a pre-determined 
price or a minimum guaranteed price. The purpose of such pricing is to control the investor’s 
exposure to potential losses from the investment, either by ensuring principal protection (with 
or without an interest component), assured returns, or limitation of downside risk.  The Indian 
                                                        
foreign portfolio investment. However, when it comes to the sale of the business, the information asymmetry is 
exacerbated when the investment is through FDI). 
9 Wang et al., supra note 6.  
10 Consolidated FDI Policy, supra note 1, at 28.  
11 Id. The cap is the maximum percentage of FDI investment in an undertaking in a sector as prescribed by the 
FDI Policy. In addition to the cap on the percentage of investment in equity that a foreign investor may make, the 
policy provides for two FDI routes - the automatic route and the government approval route. The existence of a 
cap on foreign investment does not have a bearing on the investment route. Some sectors such as publication of 
journals/magazines allow for 100 percent FDI but this FDI requires government approval. Other sectors such as 
petroleum refining cap foreign investment in equity (49 percent in this case) but do not require government 
approval for the investment.  
12 Id. at 39, 46.  
13 Kashish Makkar & Sarthak Jain, Enforcement of exit options in foreign investment agreements: a call for reform 
in Indian law, 30 INTERNATIONAL COMPANY AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW 399, 410-411 (2019); Anurag 
Pareek & Umakanth Varottil, Tata-Docomo Verdict: A Critical Analysis, INDIACORPLAW (May 30, 2017), 
https://indiacorplaw.in/2017/05/tata-docomo-verdict-critical-analysis.html.  
14 Id. at 399. Umakanth Varottil, Investment Agreements in India: Is there an “Option”?, 4 NUJS LAW REVIEW 
467, 468 (2011). 
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foreign exchange regime (administered by the Indian central bank – the Reserve Bank of India 
– and the federal government in consultation with each other), however, makes it difficult to 
enforce such put options as it requires securities held by foreign residents to be sold to Indian 
residents at a price not exceeding the fair market value prevailing at the time of exercise.15 
Though the foreign exchange laws have ostensibly permitted put options, the pricing 
requirements for the sale of securities, which until the year 2019 used to be regulated by the 
Reserve Bank of India (RBI) and is now regulated by India’s federal government,16 operates 
as an impediment to the exercise of most put options.17  The result is that even when Indian 
buyers are willing to pay the agreed pre-determined price for the securities, foreign exchange 
regulations pose significant difficulties.18  
 
The extensive use of put options by foreign investors in India, and their acceptance by Indian 
partners, is indicative of their relative bargaining power and perception of the risks of investing 
in the Indian market. For instance, in the US, a commercially advanced market characterized 
by a relatively developed and business-friendly regulatory regime, resort to such mechanisms 
is generally limited to situations dictated by the perceived risks of the specific investment, the 
creditworthiness of the counterparty and the negotiating leverage of the investor. In the Indian 
context, uncertainties created by the regulatory environment  may be another factor that drives 
investor desire for the protection of put options apart from the sector-specific business risks 
and the overall economic conditions at the time of the transaction.19 Though the main objective 
of such options is to protect against losses, India’s regulatory landscape has made them difficult 
to enforce.20  Given that foreign exchange rules do not permit the transfer of securities from a 
non-resident to a resident at a price exceeding market value,21 put options can only be 
legitimately exercised when the pre-determined sale price is lower than or equal to the 
                                                        
15 See infra, text accompanying footnotes 147, 150.  
16 Pursuant to an amendment notified in 2019, the power to regulate capital account transactions such as transfer 
of securities, other than debt instruments, vests in the federal government i.e. the Central Government of India. 
This change was primarily brought about to align the legislative source of FDI regime. Earlier, there was a 
regulatory overlap; while the federal government (the Central Government) was in charge of framing the FDI 
policy, the implementing rules and regulations came from the RBI. This caused confusion at times. This gap was 
sought to be addressed by amendments to the foreign exchange laws proposed in 2015, which were finally notified 
in October 2019. See infra, text accompanying footnote 137.  
17 See infra, text accompanying footnotes 147, 150. 
18 Id. 
19 For instance, in the case of Tata-Docomo investment transaction, which took place in the second-half of 2008, 
the then prevailing global financial crisis may have been one of many factors influencing parties’ agreement on 
the put option.  
20 See Foreign Exchange Management (Non-debt Instruments) Rules, Ministry of Finance (Department of 
Economic Affairs), Notification No. S.O. 3732(E) (Oct. 17, 2019). 
21 Id., rule 9(5) and rule 21(2)(c)(iii). 
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prevailing market price at the time of exercise22 – which of course, defeats the purpose of the 
option.   
 
In order to address this issue, parties to foreign investment agreements attempt to structure their 
transactions around these regulations. Foreign investors who are accustomed to relying on 
contractual protections (and legal opinions on their enforceability) have few legal constraints 
on the exercise of their rights.  However, domestic Indian parties who are directly subject to 
regulatory sanctions for violations of foreign investment rules are often reluctant to perform 
their contractual obligations in the absence of express approval from the regulators, which is 
generally not granted as a matter of practice. A number of these transactions therefore have 
ended up in arbitration proceedings to resolve disputes over the domestic party’s legal ability 
to perform.23  On account of such cases brought before Indian courts by foreign investors to 
enforce arbitral awards compelling the performance of put options, the Indian judiciary has 
been forced to address the conflict between the contractual rights of foreign investors and the 
regulatory regime.     
 
The Indian judiciary has consistently upheld a foreign investor’s right to sustain monetary 
claims under put options notwithstanding the regulatory restrictions.  However, they have done 
so not by ruling directly on the permissibility or enforceability of put options within the foreign 
exchange regulatory framework per se, but within the circumscribed role assigned to them 
under Indian arbitration law, which follows a narrow approach to overturning arbitral awards 
under the New York Convention. The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 199624 adopts a pro-
enforcement approach and requires that the judiciary decide on the enforceability of a foreign 
arbitral award without reviewing its merits. Significantly, Indian courts have gone further by 
holding that violations of foreign exchange rules cannot be grounds to refuse the enforcement 
of foreign arbitral awards.25  Moreover, courts have held that Indian regulators also are bound 
by arbitral findings.26  In doing so, the stance of the judiciary, though consistent with 
international commercial arbitration jurisprudence, appears at odds with the domestic 
regulatory framework governing put options. This doctrinal conflict in foreign investment 
                                                        
22 Id.  
23 See e.g.  NTT Docomo Inc. v. Tata Sons Ltd. (2017) SCC OnLine Del 8078; Cruz City v. Unitech (2017) 
SCC OnLine Del 7810; Banyan Tree v. Axiom Cordages (2020) SCC OnLine Bom 781. 
24 Arbitration and Conciliation Act, No. 26, Acts of Parliament, 1996 [Henceforth Arbitration Act] 
25 See infra Part V(A), at 38. 
26 See infra Part V(B), at 44.  
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regulation raises significant public policy implications for India. The resulting uncertainties 
call for more clarity and predictability.  This is compounded by the fact that (i) attempts to 
structure around restrictions will continue to be subject to the need for testing through costly 
arbitration and litigation, (ii) the confidential and non-stare decisis nature of arbitral 
proceedings impedes their use as precedent and (iii) notwithstanding arbitral and judicial 
findings that recognize the validity of a foreign investor’s rights, actual transmission of 
payments by Indian parties to non-residents continue to remain subject to potential regulatory 
hurdles. 
 
This paper examines case law to explain how the current regime has come to be and suggests 
regulatory reforms to provide much needed clarity for foreign investors. NTT Docomo Inc. v. 
Tata Sons Ltd.27 (the Docomo case) is an example of the regulatory uncertainties surrounding 
put option agreements and how the resolution ultimately came through a contested judicial 
process which could have been avoided if there was better regulatory clarity. Part II uses the 
Docomo case to explain how the regulatory regime has interfered with the use of a certain form 
of risk protection––downside protection––by foreign investors and gives an overview of the 
international commercial arbitration regime in India. Parts III and IV examine the evolution of 
the public policy exception in detail and explain why any optimism about the prevailing pro-
enforcement trend in the judiciary should be held with caution. Part V takes a closer look at the 
Docomo case and compares it to other High Court decisions that have dealt with the 
enforcement of put options through arbitral awards. Thereafter, Part VI explains the problem 
with relying on the judiciary and arbitration proceedings to enforce investors’ exit option rights. 
The paper emphasises the imperative to distinguish put options structured to extend downside 
protection to foreign investors from put options structured to assure financial returns to such 
investors. The paper finds that while courts will enforce foreign arbitral awards to allow 
investors to exercise a put option, the conflict between judicial and regulatory doctrine and the 
process of obtaining and enforcing awards come with their own quantitative and qualitative 
costs. Importantly, this is an unnecessary encumbrance on the enforcement of contractual rights 
and significantly increases the cost of foreign investment – for both the foreign investor as well 
as the Indian party.  
 
                                                        
27 NTT Docomo Inc. v. Tata Sons Ltd., 2017 SCC OnLine Del 8078. 
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II. THE TATA-DOCOMO CASE AND THE ROCKY ROAD TO ENFORCING PUT OPTIONS IN 
INDIA 
 
The case of NTT Docomo Inc. v. Tata Sons Ltd.28 is an important example of how foreign 
exchange laws affect a party’s ability to ensure the benefits of freely negotiated contractual 
investment protections. Docomo had invested approximately USD 2.5 billion to acquire 26 
percent of the shares in Tata Teleservices Limited (TTSL). As a safety net for Docomo’s 
investment, a clause in the Shareholders Agreement allowed Docomo to exit with at least half 
of the value (a pre-determined price) it had invested in TTSL. When Docomo exercised its 
right to exit, Tata claimed it was not possible for it to purchase Docomo’s shares at the pre-
determined price (which exceeded the fair value of the shares prevailing at the time) without 
regulatory approval from the RBI. Tata asserted that it had made efforts to obtain the approval, 
which was denied. The regulators were unwilling to grant approval to Tata for the purchase of 
Docomo’s shares based on the pre-determined terms of exit. This led to a dispute between Tata 
and Docomo which resulted in arbitration before the London Court of International Arbitration 
(LCIA). The LCIA gave its award in favour of Docomo and required Tata to pay Docomo 
damages equivalent to Docomo’s stipulated downside protection. This award was enforced in 
India through a decision of the Delhi High Court.  
 
The Docomo case represents a peculiar situation in which an award of damages for non-
performance (as opposed to specific performance) provided the only remedy for a foreign 
investor seeking to have its contract enforced. For the Indian party too, the situation was 
peculiar, as it had to face a finding of contractual breach even while it maintained that it 
remained ready and willing to pay the pre-determined contractual price, provided the regulator 
granted its approval. Because the regulatory permission was denied, Tata asserted that the only 
legal way to perform the contract was pursuant to the pricing rules mandated by the foreign 
exchange regulations, which would result in a payment significantly below the agreed amount.  
Docomo asserted, however, that the contract could be performed in full in accordance with its 
terms without violation of the rules.  As a result, arbitration became the only way to resolve 
                                                        
28 Id. Tata Sons Ltd. (Tata), the respondent, is a company incorporated in India and about 66 percent of its equity 
shareholding is held by Tata Philanthropic Trusts. Tata is the principal investment holding company of the 
business conglomerate commonly known as the ‘Tata group’, which operates in more than 100 countries across 
six continents. NTT Docomo (Docomo), the petitioner, is a company incorporated in Japan and is the biggest 
mobile telecommunications service provider in the country. It also provides services in other countries in Asia, 
Europe, and the United States. Docomo is listed on the Tokyo and New York stock exchanges.  
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the dispute with regard to performance of the contract. In this case, the foreign arbitral award 
effectively provided the means by which the parties were able to exercise contractual rights 
which they were prevented from exercising because of regulatory hurdles. Docomo was not the 
first case to face this situation. India’s restrictive put option enforcement regime has virtually 
made arbitration a pre-requisite to their enforcement.29 
 
The circumstances described above exemplify why the Indian government and the RBI need 
to rationalise their policy on put options exercisable by foreign investors.30 Put options give 
parties the right (but not the obligation) to sell their shares in a company at a pre-agreed sale 
price, and impose an obligation on the counterparty to purchase the shares at such price.31 As 
discussed above, because foreign investors use put options to secure their exit from a venture, 
the stable and predictable enforcement of put options is an important means to attract and retain 
investments.32 The Indian government and particularly the RBI, being India’s monetary policy 
regulator, are legitimately concerned by put options because they are capable of requiring 
Indian residents to pay large sums of money as consideration to purchase the securities of 
foreign investors using foreign currency.33 From a monetary policy perspective, this is capable 
of straining India’s foreign exchange reserves.34 Another objective of the regulation of put 
options is to address a policy issue at a conceptual level – balancing the objectives of FDI 
policy with the purpose of put options. The FDI regime is aimed at attracting, facilitating and 
incentivising long-term equity investments in which the foreign investor has a stake in the 
country’s economy and gets to share both the reward and risk. An option to exit at a pre-agreed 
price takes away from these long-term objectives of the FDI policy. It would also, if allowed 
in an unfettered manner, incentivise parties to structure transactions (which appear to be equity 
investments in nature) in a manner that attain the characteristics of debt (which are separately 
regulated under external borrowing rules).35 However, put options also play a role in attracting 
investments by allowing foreign investors (even long-term strategic investors) to cap their 
                                                        
29 See infra Part II, at 12.  
30 Makkar & Jain, supra note 13, at 400. 
31 Id. at 401. 
32 Id. at 401-402.  
33 Id. at 410, 414. Technically, payment is made in Rupees and are converted to Dollars under hedging 
arrangements that are entered into by the relevant party. India’s foreign exchange reserves are affected when the 
Rupees that the counterparty sells into the market flow back to India for Dollars. 
34 Id.  
35 Foreign Exchange Management (Borrowing and Lending) Regulations, Notification No. FEMA.3(R)/2018-
RB (Dec. 17, 2018) [Henceforth External Borrowing Rules]. 
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losses. This is the regulatory conundrum that needs to be addressed and requires a balancing 
act on the part of the Indian government and the RBI. 
 
A. Assured return vs. downside protection 
 
Put options can either allow investors to exit at a price which provides them assured returns or 
simply provide downside protection.36 When an investor secures assured returns through a put 
option, it will allow the investor a route to exit while recovering all of its invested capital in 
addition to returns on the investment.37 This effectively removes the risk associated with the  
investment and converts equity risk into an instrument with debt-like characteristics.38 The 
association of put options with debt instruments occurs because when exercised, put options 
require shareholders or the company to purchase the investor’s shares at the pre-determined 
sale price, which includes a return component. An investor’s ability to exit at a pre-determined 
price that is higher than or equal to the original investment takes away the essential risk-bearing 
equity characteristic of a shareholder.39 This raises concerns because the incurrence of external 
debt is separately regulated by external commercial borrowing (ECB) rules which are intended 
to control capital outflows under the same policy considerations governing maintenance of 
foreign exchange reserves.40   
 
In contrast, put options designed for downside risk protection do not guarantee investors an 
assured return on their investment.41  Rather, they limit the losses that an investor incurs. 
Typically, such options are structured (as in the Docomo case) to calculate the sale price as the 
higher of the prevailing fair market price and a set percentage of the original investment 
amount.  The sale price in put options providing downside protection will not necessarily 
enable the investor to recover the entire amount it has invested when the put option is exercised 
                                                        
36 Id. at 410-411.  Investors can also negotiate for a return of original principal invested, or for a sale at current 
appraised market value.  As a commercial matter, most investors (particularly financial investors) would seek to 
be compensated for the use of their money through an interest component.  A current fair market value approach 
is the one preferred by the regulators, which for the reasons stated above defeats the protective purpose of exit 
options.  For these reasons, this paper focuses on the assured return and downside risk options.   
37 Id.  
38 Id. at 409-410 
39 Id. at 412; Davide Contini and Guido Motti, Option agreements in private equity transactions in Italy, 
FINANCIER WORLDWIDE (Oct. 2016), https://www.financierworldwide.com/option-agreements-in-private-
equity-transactions-in-italy/#.X48sNZMzZQL. 
40 External Borrowing Rules, supra note 35. 
41 Docomo, supra note 27, [45]; Makkar & Jain supra note 13, at 411-412. 
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by it. In fact, such put options merely establish a floor price for their exercise; fair market value 
will always be used as a baseline because the selling party will want to preserve that possibility 
up to the point it merges with the floor amount.  From a regulatory perspective, concerns about 
foreign exchange outflows are mitigated to the extent of the portion of the original investment 
amount that remains in the country.  
 
Unfortunately, the current blanket regulation of all put options does not appear to contemplate 
allowing put options even for downside protection.  Both types of these put options were 
effectively made impermissible by a circular issued by the RBI in January 2014,42 and that 
position continues to date in the extant rules.43 As a result, exercise of either type of option by 
foreign investors leads to Indian parties seeking assurance from regulators that their 
performance of obligations under investment contracts will not violate local rules, and further 
lead to assertions by the Indian party that performance in the absence of such assurances is 
prohibited.44 Deadlocks among parties and regulators created by such exercises of exit rights 
inevitably lead to disputes requiring resort to India’s international commercial arbitration 
regime, which is contained in the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.45  
 
The Arbitration Act of India follows the scheme of the New York Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1958.46 The grounds on which the 
enforcement of a foreign arbitral award can be refused under the Arbitration Act are the same 
as those under Article V of the New York Convention.47 These grounds cover the capacity of 
the tribunal, arbitrability of the dispute brought to the tribunal, and procedural aspects such as 
                                                        
42 Makkar & Jain, supra note 13, at 413; Pricing Guidelines for FDI Instruments with optionality clauses (A.P. 
DIR Series Circular No. 86, Jan. 9, 2014), Reserve Bank of India.  
43 See infra, text accompanying footnotes 135, 155. 
44 Shahezad Kazi & Aditi Agarwal, Enforcement Of Foreign Awards Granting A Put Option Despite Objections 
Under The FEMA, MONDAQ (Jul. 22, 2020); https://www.mondaq.com/india/securities/968018/enforcement-of-
foreign-awards-granting-a-put-option-despite-objections-under-the-fema; Nandan Nelivigi et al., In a landmark 
ruling, Indian court rejects objections to enforcement of a $300 million LCIA award, WHITE & CASE (Jun. 7, 
2017), https://www.whitecase.com/publications/alert/landmark-ruling-indian-court-rejects-objections-
enforcement-300-million-lcia.  
45 Arbitration Act, supra note 24. 
46 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 21.3 U.S.T. 2517 
[Henceforth New York Convention]. 
47 See Vijay Karia v. Prysmian Cavi, 2020 SCC Online SC 177 [54], referring to Cruz City v. Unitech (2017) 
SCC OnLine Del 7810, “…Section 48 of the Act is a statutory expression of Article V of the New York 
Convention and is similarly worded.”; Amendments to the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, Report No. 
246, Law Commission of India (August. 2014), at 4 [Henceforth Law Commission Report]. 
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the right to notice and the right to present one’s case.48 In addition to the aforementioned 
grounds, the courts in the country where the enforcement of a foreign award is sought can reject 
its enforcement if such enforcement would be contrary to the public policy of that country.49 
Indian courts have long grappled with the scope of the public policy exception to enforcing 
foreign arbitral awards. While the current arbitration law adopts a “pro-enforcement” 
approach,50 a 2020 Supreme Court decision has brought back uncertainty regarding the public 
policy exception’s scope.51  
 
Foreign arbitral awards based on put option clauses have been consistently challenged on the 
grounds that their enforcement would violate India’s foreign exchange law, and consequently 
India’s public policy. So far, High Courts and the Supreme Court of India have rejected this 
reasoning.52 The courts’ stance has been that the public policy exception ought to be applied 
narrowly and that this approach would have to be followed even when it comes to foreign 
awards which effectively enforce put options. It has also been held that a contravention of 
India’s foreign exchange laws alone will not warrant the application of the public policy 
exception.53 The courts’ consistent approach to enforcing foreign awards is an important 
reassurance for foreign investors. However, this pro-enforcement approach has its limitations; 
a general commitment to creating a foreign investor-friendly policy and regulatory reform from 
the Indian government and the RBI are also required to create a stable and predictable 
investment environment in India. This would also significantly reduce the costs of enforcing 
contractual exit rights held by foreign investors by reducing disputes and the need to resort to 
arbitration.  
 
III. THE PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION UNDER INDIAN COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION LAW 
 
                                                        
48 Arbitration Act, supra note 24, s. 48(1). 
49 Id. s. 48(2). 
50 Vijay Karia, supra note 47, [47]; Debarshri Dutta & Rajat Pradhan, Delhi High Court Reaffirms "Pro-
Enforcement" Approach –Enforcement Of Foreign Awards Is Slowly Becoming The Rule, MONDAQ (Jul. 10, 
2020), https://www.mondaq.com/india/arbitration-dispute-resolution/963570/delhi-high-court-reaffirms-pro-
enforcement-approach-enforcement-of-foreign-awards-is-slowly-becoming-the-rule. 
51 National Agricultural Cooperative Market Federation in India v. Alimenta (2020) SCC Online SC 381;  
52 See Banyan Tree v. Axiom Cordages (2020) SCC OnLine Bom 781; Vijay Karia, supra note 47; Docomo 
supra note 27; Shakti Nath v. Alpha Tiger (2017) SCC OnLine Del 6894; Cruz City v. Unitech (2017) SCC 
OnLine Del 7810.  
53 Vijay Karia, supra note 47, [90]-[91]  
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International arbitration law in India has been consolidated by the Arbitration and Conciliation 
Act, 1996.54 The Arbitration Act divides arbitration proceedings into foreign seated arbitration 
and India seated arbitration.55 Any reference to a foreign arbitral award is thus a reference to 
an award of a foreign seated arbitration. This is significant as the international nature of the 
dispute (number of international parties) does not have a bearing on how the Arbitration Act 
treats the award rendered as a result of the  dispute.56 The nature of the award is determined on 
the basis of the seat of arbitration and not based on the international or domestic status of its 
parties.57 This framework has allowed even domestic parties to choose seats of arbitration 
outside India and have these awards enforced as foreign arbitral awards.58 High Court decisions 
have largely supported this practice with a few exceptions59 and the Supreme Court has not 
made any conclusive pronouncements on the issue.60 While the decision of one High Court in 
India is not binding on others, the prevailing jurisprudence allows domestic parties to choose 
foreign seats of arbitration.61 When an foreign party is involved, it is unquestionably clear that 
parties can choose a foreign seat of arbitration.  
 
In India, the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards is governed by Part II of the Arbitration 
Act. Section 48 of this Part applies Article V of the New York Convention to India and contains 
the public policy exception.62 A key difference between Article V and section 48 in the context 
of the public policy exception is that the latter explains what comprises public policy. As of 
2020, the constituents of an award in violation of public policy have been exhaustively defined 
as awards that are either the result of any fraud of corruption, or in contravention of the 
                                                        
54 Arbitration Act, supra note 24, Preamble. 
55 Pierre Tercier & Dilber Devitre, The Pubilc Policy Exception, a Comparison of the Indian and Swiss 
Perspectives, 5 INDIAN JOURNAL OF ARBITRATION LAW 7, 9 (2016). 
56 Id.  
57 Id.  
58 GE  Power Conversion India v. Pasl Wind Solutions (2020) Petition under Arbitration Act No. 131/2019; 
GMR Energy Ltd. v. Doosan Power Systems (2017) SCC OnLine Del 11625; Sasan Power Limited v. North 
American Coal Corporation India Pvt. Ltd., First Appeal No. 310/2015. 
59 Addhar Mercantile v. Shree Jagdamba Agrico Exports (2015) SCC OnLine Bom 7752; 
Seven Islands Shipping v. Sah Petroleums (2012) SCC Online Bom 910;  
60 Tejas Karia et al., Post Amendments: What Plagues Arbitration in India? 5 INDIAN JOURNAL OF ARBITRATION 
LAW 230, 240-241 (2016); Vivek Bajaj & Vinay Butani, Can two Indian parties agree to foreign seated 
arbitration? AZB PARTNERS (May 5, 2020), https://www.azbpartners.com/bank/can-two-indian-parties-agree-
to-foreign-seated-arbitration/. 
61 Bajaj & Butani, supra note 60;  Sudipto Dey, Arbitration proceedings: Order on foreign jurisdiction has a 
caveat, BUSINESS STANDARD (Nov. 7, 2020), http://www.business-
standard.com.iima.remotexs.in/article/companies/arbitration-proceedings-order-on-foreign-jurisdiction-has-a-
caveat-120110700070_1.html. 
62 Vijay Karia, supra note 47, [34], [39]. 
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fundamental policy of Indian law, or opposed to the basic notions of justice and morality.63 
Section 48 also clarifies that it cannot be used as a basis to review the merits of a foreign arbitral 
award. A court’s scope of review is limited to the findings of the arbitral tribunal and does not 
extend to scrutinising the basis of those findings or reviewing the rationale of the arbitral 
tribunal in arriving at them. This refinement of the public policy exception under the 
Arbitration Act was effected through an amendment to it in 2015.64 The circumstances 
necessitating the 2015 amendment were created by judicial decisions that broadly applied the 
public policy exception. These decisions also shed light on the underlying uncertainty of the 
Indian Courts’ approach to enforcing foreign awards. The evolution of the application of the 
public policy exception in India has been discussed below through case laws. These case laws 
have influenced India’s arbitration law not only by establishing precedent but also guiding 
legislative action. 
 
A. Setting the course of history – the Renusagar decision 
 
The case of Renusagar v. General Electric65 (Renusagar) was decided by the Supreme Court 
in 1993, three years before the 1996 Arbitration Act came into effect. The law in force that 
governed the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards at that time was the Foreign Awards 
(Enforcement and Recognition) Act, 1961.66 Like the Arbitration Act, the Foreign Awards Act 
was also enacted to give effect to the New York Convention.67 The provisions of the Foreign 
Awards Act for the objections to the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards are essentially the 
same as that of the Arbitration Act. The public policy exception in the Foreign Awards Act 
was contained in section 7(1)(b)(ii). The provisions of section 7 of the Foreign Awards Act and 
section 48 of the Arbitration Act are substantially the same and are considered in pari materia.68  
A recent Supreme Court judgement (discussed in detail in Part IV) has held that precedents set 
in the context of section 7 of the Foreign Awards Act will apply to section 48 of the Arbitration 
                                                        
63 Arbitration Act, supra note 24, s. 48(2)(b) 
64 Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, No. 3, Acts of Parliament, 2016 [Henceforth Arbitration 
Amendment]. 
65 1994 Supp (1) SCC 644 [Henceforth Renusagar]. 
66 Foreign Awards (Enforcement and Recognition) Act, No. 45, Acts of Parliament, 1961. 
67 Id. Preamble. 
68 Vijay Karia, supra note 47, [34], [39]; David Tarh-Akong Eyongndi, An Appraisal of the Perennial Hurdles 
in the Enforcement of Arbitral Awards in Nigeria and India, 10 RAM MANOHAR LOHIA NATIONAL LAW 
UNIVERSITY JOURNAL 84, 104-105 (2018). 
 16 
Act.69 This is why the Renusagar case continues to be extensively relied on by High Courts 
and the Supreme Court even though it was not decided under the current commercial arbitration 
law.70  
 
The facts of Renusagar concerned provisions of the Indian foreign exchange law which were 
prevalent at that time and will be discussed in Part IV. Here, the discussion will focus on the 
interpretation of the public policy exception given under the Renusagar case.  In Renusagar, 
the Supreme Court acknowledged that it was impossible to come up with an accurate definition 
of public policy.71 The court cited its own precedent which explained the meaning of the 
concept in broad terms. Public policy referred to matters concerning the public good and public 
interest, but the court acknowledged that the notions of public interest were itself temporal and 
bound to vary with time.72 Though the Supreme Court could not define the concept, the court 
addressed three important questions surrounding it: -  
 
1. whether the public policy exception referred to the public policy of India or public 
policy under private international law;  
2. whether the exception ought to be construed narrowly or broadly; and 
3. whether a violation of law would amount to a contravention of public policy. 
 
As discussed above, the Foreign Awards Act used the same grounds for refusing the 
enforcement of a foreign arbitral award as Article V of the New York Convention. However, 
there was a small difference in how the public policy exception was phrased in both provisions. 
Under Article V, the exception referred the “contravention of the public policy of the country” 
where the award’s enforcement was being sought.73 Differing from this wording, the Foreign 
Awards Act simply stated that a “contravention of public policy” could be used as a reason by 
a court to withhold a foreign award’s enforcement in India. This raised a question about the 
scope of public policy under the Foreign Awards Act, specifically whether section 7 was 
referring to public policy in the context of international private law or the public policy of 
India.  
                                                        
69 Shri Lal Mahal Ltd. v. Progetto Grano SP, 2014 (2) SCC 433 [28] [Henceforth, Progetto]; Vijay Karia, supra 
note 47, [35], [39]. 
70 Progetto, supra note 69, [28]; Vijay Karia, supra note 47, [34], [39]. 
71 See Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. v. Brojo Nath Ganguly, 1986 3 SCC 156. 
72 Id.; Renusagar, supra note 65, [46]. 
73 New York Convention, supra note 46, art. V(2)(b). 
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The party opposing the enforcement of the foreign arbitral award contended that the text of 
section 7 of the Foreign Awards Act needed to be interpreted as conferring an expansive 
definition to the phrase “public policy” and one that would go beyond the public policy of 
India. Article V of the New York Convention clearly stated that an award contravening the 
public policy of the enforcing jurisdiction need not be enforced by the respective court. Section 
7 did not have such a qualification for its public policy exception and only referred to public 
policy as an exception without specifying whether it was referring to the public policy of India. 
The Supreme Court rejected this argument and held that the intention behind not explicitly 
stating which public policy comprised an exception under the Foreign Awards Act could not 
have been to deviate from the New York Convention. The Foreign Awards Act was enacted 
with the objective of enforcing the provisions of the New York Convention.74 Hence, an 
assumption that an absence of a qualification of public policy was intended to go against the 
provisions the New York Convention would be untenable. The Supreme Court also referred to 
the United Kingdom Arbitration Act of 1975 which was also enacted to enforce the New York 
Convention. The public policy exception in the UK Arbitration Act also did not explicitly refer 
to the public policy of England. However, the interpretation and application of the provision 
was still limited to the public policy of the England. A key reason for this was that courts in 
the UK were not adequately equipped to inquire into the public policy of other jurisdictions.75 
In  Renusagar, the court also found practical difficulties in using the standard of international 
public policy, because it would be more difficult to define and prone to subjective interpretation 
by different states.76 Based on all these reasons, the Supreme Court in Renusagar confirmed 
that the public policy exception was concerned with contraventions of India’s public policy.  
 
After resolving the question of which public policy could be a consideration for refusing to 
enforce an award, the Renusagar bench determined the manner in which the public policy 
exception should be applied. Precedent from England showed that there were two approaches 
to construing the exception, the broad view and the narrow view.77 The key distinction between 
the two views is the level of judicial intervention permissible under each of them. The narrow 
view requires courts to be judicious in their application of the exception and refrain from adding 
                                                        
74 Foreign Awards Act, Preamble. 
75 Renusagar, supra note 65, [44]  
76 Id. [62]-[63]. 
77 Id. [48] 
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to the constituents of public policy.78 The broad view allows courts more latitude to include 
different heads under the public policy exception.79 When Renusagar was being decided, the 
Supreme Court had already criticised the broad view of the exception because it enabled 
judicial activism and allowed for the courts to decide the contents of the law rather than 
interpret it.80 However, the Supreme Court’s position was not consistent; some decisions prior 
to Renusagar did not ascribe to the narrow view and preferred the broad view.81  The 
Renusagar court decided to adopt the narrow view and held that the design of the Foreign 
Awards Act was meant to facilitate the smooth enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. In order 
to reach its conclusion Renusagar referred to precedent from the United States82 which 
emphasised the pro-enforcement framework of the New York Convention.83 The US Supreme 
Court had concluded that countries cannot expect to access the benefits of international trade 
and foreign markets (and capital) based on their own terms and laws alone.84  The same 
rationale would apply to the dispute resolution mechanism for matters related to international 
trade; a country could not have all disputes relating to it or its residents decided based on its 
own domestic laws.85   
 
The Supreme Court then turned to the question of the implications of a foreign arbitral award 
violating Indian laws. In Renusagar the Supreme Court compared the Foreign Awards Act to 
the Geneva Convention of 1927 and the Protocol & Convention Act of 1837. The public policy 
exception in these laws differentiated between a country’s public policy and its laws; either 
could be independently used as a basis to refuse the enforcement of an award by a court. 
Contrastingly, the Foreign Awards Act referred to public policy “and” the law of India.86 In 
Renusagar, the Supreme Court held that because public policy was not equivalent to the law 
of India, a violation of a law alone will not warrant the application of the public policy 
exception.87 Importantly, the public policy exception could not be used to replicate the result 
of a domestic adjudication. Even if the foreign award reaches a different conclusion than a 
                                                        
78 Id. 
79 Id.  
80 Id. See Gherulal Parakh v. Mahadeodas Maiya AIR 1959 SC 781 [22]-[23]; Egerton v. Brownlow 1938 AC 1, 
123. 
81 Renusagar, supra note 65, [49]. See Murlidhar v. State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1974 SC 1924. 
82 Renusagar, supra note 65, [59]. See Fritz Sherk v. Alberto-Culver Co. 1974 SCC OnLine US SC 128 [17]. 
83 Fritz Sherk, supra note 82. 
84 Id.; Renusagar, supra note 65, [59]. See Eyongndi, supra note 66, at 103.  
85 Renusagar, supra note 65, [59].  
86 Id. [66] 
87 Id. [65]. 
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domestic court would have, this cannot be the basis for rejecting the enforcement of the arbitral 
award.88 In order to add more clarity to the limits of the public policy exception, Renusagar 
provided three instances when an award could be set aside on the grounds public policy:  
 
1. when it contravenes the fundamental policy of Indian law; or  
2. the interests of India; or  
3. justice and morality.  
 
The Renusagar case, and its three-pronged conceptualisation of the public policy exception 
have reverberated through India’s commercial arbitration jurisprudence for over two decades. 
As already discussed, the Arbitration Act treats domestic awards and foreign seated awards 
differently. The counter part of section 48 (foreign arbitral awards) for the purpose of domestic 
arbitral awards is section 34. When the Act was introduced in 1996, sections 34 and 48 
contained the same provisions, seemingly implying that domestic seated and foreign seated 
arbitral awards would be enforceable based on the same criteria. Despite Renusagar, the broad 
view for the application of the public policy exception started taking root in the context of 
foreign arbitral awards on account of the similarities between sections 48 and 34.  
 
B. Fluctuations in the conception of public policy under the Arbitration Act 1996  
 
The Renusagar case has been applied by the Supreme Court in subsequent decisions to support 
both the broad and narrow views for the application of the public policy exception. This itself 
is a testament to the unpredictability of the reach of public policy in the context of international 
commercial arbitration. The judiciary’s reins on the concept of public policy were first relaxed 
in the case of ONGC v. Saw Pipes.89 Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC), an Indian 
corporation majority owned by the government, had issued a tender for the supply of pipes for 
one of its projects. Saw Pipes, also an Indian corporation, was selected to supply these pipes to 
ONGC but because of a general steel workers’ strike across Europe, Saw Pipes was unable to 
procure the raw material to supply ONGC with the pipes on time. ONGC granted Saw Pipes a 
45-day extension to make their delivery provided that liquidated damages for the delay in 
                                                        
88 Id. [60]. See Mitsubishi Motors Corpn. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc. 87 L Ed. 2d 444. 
89 2003 (5) SCC 705. 
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supply (per the contract) were deducted from the consideration payable by ONGC. Saw Pipes 
disputed this deduction and the matter was referred to domestic arbitration. 
 
The domestic arbitral tribunal found that there were other causes to the delay experienced by 
ONGC in its project and that it had suffered no losses from Saw Pipes’ late delivery. The 
tribunal used the Indian Contract Act, 1872 and case laws to hold that ONGC had to show that 
it had suffered damages in order to claim the liquidated damages, which it had not done. 
Accordingly, it held that the deducted amount from Saw Pipes’ consideration had to be returned 
with an interest of 12 percent. The enforcement of this award was challenged before the 
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court reviewed the decision of the arbitral tribunal and held that 
it had erroneously applied Indian law and the terms of the contract to make its award, and held 
the award to be “patently illegal”. It was stated that the illegality must go to the root of the 
matter and not simply be an erroneous application of the law. Further, the enforceability of 
liquidated damages is also not a settled question under Indian law.90 The Supreme Court here 
was making an active choice to prefer its application and interpretation of the law over that of 
the arbitral tribunal. However, before the Supreme Court could act on its finding that the award 
was patently illegal; it had to establish that public policy under section 34 of the Arbitration 
Act permitted the inclusion of new categories under it.  
 
On the question of the scope of public policy under section 34, the Supreme Court differentiated 
it from section 48 of the Arbitration Act and section 7 of the Foreign Awards Act. By doing 
this, the ONGC court restricted the application of Renusagar’s ruling that the public policy 
exception ought to be applied narrowly to foreign arbitral awards alone. The basis of this 
distinction was that foreign awards are brought before Indian courts only for the purpose of 
deciding their enforcement and not their validity, “in foreign arbitration, the award is subject 
to being set aside or suspended by the competent authority under the relevant law of that 
country whereas in the domestic arbitration the only recourse is to Section 34.”91  
                                                        
90 T.T. Arvind, The ‘Transplant Effect’ in Harmonization, 59 INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW 
QUARTERLY 65, 74 (2010).  
91 Saw Pipes, supra note 89, [20]-[22]. Although the drafting of section 34 and 48 of the Arbitration Act is almost 
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This difference between ‘refusing enforcement’ and ‘setting aside’ of an arbitral award can also be noted from the 
Explanatory Note prepared by UNCITRAL to the Model Law. See, Sidharth Sharma, Public Policy under the 
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A foreign award’s validity can be challenged before the foreign court which has jurisdiction at 
the relevant seat of arbitration. However, for domestic awards, Indian courts are the only fora 
where the award can be challenged both in the context of their enforcement and their validity.92 
Accordingly, the Supreme Court added “patent illegality” as the fourth category to Renusagar’s 
existing three categories of public policy. In ONGC v. Western Geco,93 the scope of public 
policy was further expanded to include the reasonableness of an award under it.  This was done 
by broadly interpreting the first category of public policy (fundamental policy of India) under 
Renusagar.94 The cases of Saw Pipes and Western Geco were in the context of domestic 
arbitration and did not venture into interpreting the scope of the public policy under section 48 
(enforcement of foreign arbitral awards).  
 
In 2011, the Supreme Court, in the case of Phulchand v. O.O.O. Patriot95 held that the broad 
view of the public policy exception under section 34 could be expanded and applied to section 
48 of the Arbitration Act.96 This meant that a foreign arbitral award could be set aside if a court 
found that it was patently illegal. In Phulchand the Supreme Court probed the merits of the 
award and ultimately found that it was not patently illegal.97 However, by giving itself the 
liberty to consider setting aside a foreign arbitral award on the grounds of patent illegality, the 
Phulchand court set a dangerous precedent. This decision emboldened parties to object to the 
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards on the grounds that they contravened the terms of the 
underlying contract between parties. This would make awards patently illegal as the Arbitration 
Act requires that tribunals decide cases while considering terms of the contract.98 An attempt 
to set aside a foreign arbitral award based on patent illegality was made in the case of Shri Lal 
Mahal v. Progetto.99 The appellant had asked the Supreme Court to set aside a foreign arbitral 
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award based on the Phulchand and Saw Pipes decisions.100 Though the judge who authored the 
Phulchand decision was on the Progetto bench,  the Supreme Court in Progetto overruled 
Phulchand.101 The Progetto court held that the law laid down by Phulchand was incorrect and 
that the narrow interpretation mandated by the Renusagar court would apply to the public 
policy exception under section 48.102 Thus, the broad approach to interpreting the public policy 
exception was once again restricted to the context of enforcing domestic awards. This also 
meant that patent illegality would only be a ground to reject the enforcement of domestic 
arbitral awards and not foreign ones.103  
 
The judicial developments discussed above drew attention to the public policy exception and 
the enforcement of arbitral awards in India. The Law Commission of India, in its August 2014 
Report (and a Supplementary Report which was published shortly thereafter),104 agreed with 
the Supreme Court decision in Progetto and stated that increased court intervention is only 
legitimate in arbitration that is purely domestic in nature, i.e., where there is no international 
party involved. In other words, the Law Commission favoured a narrower application of the 
public policy exception to enforcement of arbitral awards in India-seated international 
commercial arbitrations105 which are considered to be domestic awards under the Arbitrtion 
Act.106 The Report noted that the judiciary’s approach prior to Progetto in cases such as Saw 
Pipes and Phulchand was not arbitration friendly and went against the ethos of the New York 
Convention. The Law Commission Report recommended amendments to sections 34 and 48 to 
streamline the use of the public policy exception. Both sections were amended to include 
Renusagar’s three-pronged enumeration of public policy except for the category referring to, 
“the interests of India.” The Law Commission found that this category was vague and amenable 
to broader application and interpretational misuse.107 The final three enumerations of the public 
policy exception under sections 34 and 48 proposed by the Report were – an award effected by 
fraud and corruption, or against the fundamental policy of Indian law, or in contravention to 
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the basic principles of morality and justice.108 The proposed amendment was meant to make 
the definition of public policy exhaustive. A contravention of public policy could occur only if 
the award met any of the three criteria mentioned above. As for the “patent illegality” criteria 
added by Saw Pipes, the Report recommended that the same be retained but decoupled from 
the notion of public policy. It was suggested that patent illegality be added to section 34 through 
a separate provision and applied as a ground to set aside arbitral awards arising out of 
arbitrations other than international commercial arbitrations. This would prevent any 
misconception that patent illegality falls under the public policy exception or that it can be used 
to set aside a foreign award under section 48. The Supplementary Report went one step further 
and recommended that section 34 should explicitly state that courts are not allowed to review 
an award on its merit to decide whether it falls within the “fundamental policy of Indian law” 
category of the public policy exception.109 This recommendation was made to directly address 
the expansive interpretation Western Geco had given to the fundamental policy of Indian law 
under the public policy exception. By prohibiting the review of an award’s merits, the Report 
intended to prevent courts from setting aside awards on the grounds of unreasonableness or 
any other disagreement with the approach taken by the arbitral tribunal.110  
 
The Government of India accepted all the recommendations of the Law Commission Report 
and Supplementary Report, which were followed by Parliament’s enactment of the Arbitration 
and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015.111 Parliament’s amendment went one step further 
and applied the Supplemental Report’s recommendation for section 34 to section 48 as well.112 
As the law currently stands, the public policy exception is exhaustively defined through three 
headings recommended by the Report under section 34 and section 48, and patent illegality is 
a separate ground under section 34 to set aside an arbitral award passed in India-seated 
arbitrations (domestic arbitral awards) other than international commercial arbitrations.113 
Enforcement of a foreign arbitral award can now be refused under section 48 on the grounds 
of violating the public policy of India only if the award: - 
 
1. is a result of fraud or corruption; or 
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2. contravenes the fundamental policy of Indian law; or  
3. opposes the most basic notions of justice or morality.114  
 
Finally, the amendment ensured that the court cannot review the merits of an award in order to 
decide whether or not it is in contravention to the fundamental policy of India. A bare reading 
of the amended text of the Arbitration Act conveys an expectation of judicial restraint, 
especially in the context of setting aside foreign arbitration awards. The Amendment Act was 
considered a step towards a pro-enforcement direction for commercial arbitration in India.115 
 
C. Regressive currents in India’s arbitration waters: NAFED v. Alimenta 
 
The mandate of the amended Arbitration Act greatly clarified the standard by which foreign 
arbitral awards based on put options are enforced in India by the judiciary. Before looking at 
the evolution of the judicial interpretations of the public policy exception in the context of the 
foreign exchange law, this Part will conclude with an overview of the Supreme Court’s recent 
decision in National Agricultural Cooperative Market Federation in India (“NAFED”) v. 
Alimenta.116 This case is important as it marks yet another turn in the Indian judiciary’s 
approach to the public policy exception and could potentially make courts regress to the broad 
approach of the exception’s application.  
 
NAFED (an Indian canalizing agency) entered into a contract with Alimenta (a US company) 
to ship 5000 metric tonnes of groundnuts (commodity). Only 1900 metric tonnes of the 
commodity could be shipped in the time period stipulated in the contract. The shipment of the 
remaining 3100 tonnes was delayed on account of cyclones in India that affected crop yield.117 
After a series of addendums, it was agreed that the remaining 3100 tonnes would be shipped 
by NAFED in the year 1980-81, instead of 1979-80 as initially envisioned by the contract.118 
NAFED was prevented from shipping the commodity as agreed to in the addendum because of 
a government prohibition in place. The prohibition prevented carrying over exports for one 
year into another after 1980 without government permission. NAFED stated that it did not 
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realise that it required government permission to enter into the addendum where it committed 
to ship the commodity in the year 1980-81. NAFED had assumed that the permission granted 
to it in the period of 1977-80 would be carried over to the next year as it was the same contract 
being executed.119 When NAFED was unable to deliver the remaining amount of the 
commodity,  Alimenta opted for arbitration (seated in London) and was awarded damages 
payable by NAFED.120 
 
When the Supreme Court of India considered the enforcement of the arbitral award in NAFED, 
it had to do so under the Foreign Awards Act, as the case arose before the Arbitration Act was 
enacted. Despite using the provisions of the Foreign Awards Act, NAFED remains relevant 
because previous Supreme Court decisions have used case laws under the Foreign Awards Act 
to interpret the public policy exception under section 48 of the Arbitration Act.121 It has been 
held that the public policy exception under the Foreign Awards Act is pari materia or 
substantially similar to those under section 48 of the Arbitration Act.122 In NAFED, the 
Supreme Court did not restrict itself to precedent relating to the Foreign Award Act and 
traversed cases from Renusagar to Progetto. NAFED’s final interpretation of the public policy 
exception is thus an authoritative application of the precedent it has relied on. Even though the 
Foreign Award Act is no longer applicable, NAFED’s interpretation of Supreme Court 
precedent on the Arbitration Act (to support the broad approach taken by it) can be used in the 
context of other cases under the Arbitration Act.123 Accordingly, NAFED has the potential to 
influence the application of the public policy exception under section 48 in future cases.  
 
When the Supreme Court considered the enforcement of the arbitral award in favour of 
Alimenta, it took an approach that was closer to the Saw Pipes decision (which permitted courts 
to broadly construe the public policy exception) than the Progetto decision (which required 
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courts to narrowly apply the public policy exception). Going against its own precedent, the 
Supreme Court in NAFED reviewed the facts of the case and the merits of the award. It used 
the Indian Contract Act and Indian case laws to state that the conclusion reached by the 
arbitrator that NAFED owed damages to Alimenta was untenable and incorrect. This was 
despite the fact the law applicable to the construction of the contract based on the agreement 
between the parties (and quoted by the Supreme Court) was English contract law.  
 
After detailing why the award was incorrect, the Supreme Court set it aside on the grounds that 
it was opposed to the fundamental policy of India relating to exports. This conclusion was 
reached based on the apparent infirmities of the award as identified by NAFED and the fact 
that shipping a regulated commodity would contravene the government’s export regulations.124 
This is another instance of where the fundamental policy of India has been applied broadly. 
The Supreme Court identified export policy and laws as being a part of the fundamental policy 
of India.125 However, it remains unclear what separates this policy from others. As mentioned 
above, this judgement was rendered under the Foreign Awards Act and some writers have 
stated that for this reason, it will not be binding on future benches of the Supreme Court.126 
Others suggest that the case can be used to justify a broader application of the public policy 
exception when deciding on the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. 127 NAFED thus gives 
rise to legitimate concerns. At the very least, it is safe to say that NAFED demonstrates the 
malleability of the Supreme Court’s pro-enforcement approach.128  
 
Having discussed the scope and limitations of the public policy exception and the Indian 
judiciary’s approach to enforcing foreign awards, this paper now turns to the question of 
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foreign arbitral awards that deal with put options. The Indian Supreme Court and High Courts  
have successfully kept such awards out of the reach of the public policy exception, but there 
are unique challenges to enforcing awards relating to put options in India. The next Part 
discusses all of these issues in detail.  
 
IV. ENFORCING PUT OPTIONS THROUGH FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS 
 
The approach taken by the High Courts and the Supreme Court in enforcing arbitral awards 
relating to put option clauses has been a liberal one that has deferred to the reasoning of arbitral 
tribunals and strictly applied the public policy exception. This has been grounded in the 
permissive  nature of India’s current foreign exchange regulatory regime (as discussed below)  
and the courts’ refusal to interfere with the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, especially 
after the 2015 amendment of the Arbitration Act.129 Despite the courts’ pro-enforcement 
approach, challenges to ensuring a stable and predictable regulatory environment for investors 
remain. This Part examines these challenges through important case laws decided by the High 
Courts and the Supreme Court of India. Before delving into individual cases, the following 
discussion outlines the foreign exchange laws governing put options exercisable by foreign 
investors in India.   
 
A. Regulatory framework under the Foreign Exchange Management Act 
 
India’s parent foreign exchange law is the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 
(FEMA).130 FEMA is principally administered by the RBI which is endowed with delegated 
legislative powers to frame regulations and issue directions under the Act; on certain aspects, 
the power vests with the Central Government which makes rules.131 Accordingly, put options 
are governed by provisions under FEMA and delegated legislations such as rules,  regulations 
and circulars as issued thereunder and amended from time to time (collectively referred to as 
FEMA Regulations). The following discussion maps current laws and regulations governing 
                                                        
129 The current regulatory regime does not impose absolute prohibitions and retains a room for discretionary 
approvals by the Central Bank. “Permissive” in the context of India’s foreign exchange regime, therefore, does 
not refer to leniency. Rather it is a key feature of India’s foreign exchange regulations which do not declare all 
transactions that contravene it to be void. The RBI has the ability to permit a transaction that goes against foreign 
exchange regulations. 
130 Foreign Exchange & Management Act, No. 42 Acts of Parliament, 1999. 
131 Id. ss.  11, 47 deal with powers of the RBI to issue directions and frame regulations. The Central Government 
has powers to make rules under s. 46 of FEMA. 
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put options exercisable by foreign investors in India.  
 
The current scheme of regulation132 under FEMA is that a transaction is prohibited unless (i) it 
is covered by a general statutory or regulatory permission or (ii) the RBI gives special 
permission for the transaction. Thus, under FEMA there are three permissible means of dealing 
in foreign exchange, the first is through any transaction that has been allowed by FEMA itself, 
the second is through transactions that are covered by the general permission under FEMA 
Regulations, and the third is through transactions for which special permission of the RBI has 
been obtained.   
 
Furthermore, there is an important distinction between the regulatory approach under FEMA 
to a capital account transaction and a current account transaction. Section 2(e) of FEMA defines 
“capital account transactions” to include “a transaction which alters the assets or liabilities, 
including contingent liabilities, outside India of persons resident in India or assets or liabilities 
in India of persons resident outside India”. Section 2(j) of FEMA defines “current account 
transactions” generally as “a transaction other than a capital account transaction” including 
some illustrative transactions specified in the section.  
 
Section 5 of FEMA permits dealings in foreign exchange which are a part of current account 
transactions, subject to “such reasonable restrictions for current account transactions as may be 
prescribed” by the Central Government in consultation with the RBI and in the public 
interest.133 Therefore, the regulatory approach to current account transactions appear to be more 
liberal inasmuch as they are permissible as long as they are not prohibited. In contrast, capital 
account transactions are more closely regulated by FEMA. Section 6 of FEMA allows dealing 
in foreign exchange for a capital account transaction. The class or classes of capital account 
transactions which are permissible have to be specified by the RBI and the Central Government 
                                                        
132 This regulatory scheme can be gathered from the express provision under Section 3 of FEMA, which states: 
“Save as otherwise provided in this Act, rules or regulations made there under, or with the general or special 
permission of the Reserve Bank, no person shall–(a) deal in or transfer any foreign exchange or foreign security 
to any person not being an authorized person; (b) make any payment to or for the credit of any person resident 
outside India in any manner; …”. Accordingly, the RBI has an overarching, discretionary power to grant special 
permission for any dealing in, or transfer of, foreign exchange or of a foreign security or payment to any person 
resident outside India that falls within FEMA and is not generally permitted under FEMA, its rules or any of the 
regulations framed by the RBI. The Indian Supreme Court has recognized that special permission can be given by 
the RBI even ex post facto, see, Life Insurance Corporation of India v Escorts Ltd and Others, 1986 (1) SCC 264 
[65]. 
133  FEMA, s. 5. 
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in consultation with each other. Until October 2019, the RBI was empowered to frame 
regulations to allow, in consultation with the Central Government, the classes of capital account 
transactions along with conditions such as the set limit up to which they are permissible.134 
Pursuant to certain amendments to FEMA notified in October 2019, the power to specify 
permissible capital account transactions involving “debt instruments” now vests in the RBI 
whereas those involving non-debt instruments (e.g. equity instruments) rests with the Central 
Government which has to consult with the RBI.135   Thus, in so far as capital account 
transactions are concerned, unless the RBI and the Central Government have specified them to 
be permissible, they are considered to be prohibited, except where a special permission is 
sought and granted.  Prior to the 2019 Amendments to FEMA, Section 6(3) of FEMA gave an 
illustrative list of the classes of capital account transactions that the RBI is empowered to 
prohibit, restrict or regulate. One such class of capital account transaction was “transfer or issue 
of any security by a person resident outside India”.136 Under Section 47 of FEMA, the RBI had 
the general power to make regulations in relation to, inter alia, “the permissible classes of 
capital account transactions, the limits of admissibility of foreign exchange for such 
transactions, and the prohibition, restriction or regulation of certain capital account transactions 
under Section 6”.137  
 
Put options contemplate capital account transactions because, when exercised by the foreign 
investor, they result in a transfer of security (shares) by the non-resident shareholder, thereby 
constituting a transaction that alters the assets or liabilities in India of persons resident outside 
India. Since they are capital account transactions, the RBI (prior to the 2019 Amendments) had 
the authority to regulate them under FEMA. The RBI regulated each class of permissible capital 
account transactions by way of separate regulations made for the class. Using its power to 
regulate “transfer or issue of any security by a person resident outside India” under the then in 
force Section 6(3)(b) and Section 47 of FEMA, the RBI regulated the transfers of securities by 
a person resident outside India to a person resident in India through the Foreign Exchange 
                                                        
134  FEMA s. 6. 
135 Ministry of Finance (Department of Economic Affairs), Notification No. S.O. 3715(E) (Oct. 15, 2019) 
[Henceforth, 2019 Amendments]. Consequent to the 2019 Amendments, sections 6, 46 and 47 of FEMA stood 
amended to provide for the powers of the RBI and the Central Government to make regulations and rules 
concerning capital account transactions involving debt and non-debt instruments respectively. See FEMA, s. 
6(2)(a), (2A) read with 46(2)(ab) and 47(2)(a). 
136 Id. s. 6(3)(b) 
137 Id. s. 47(1)(a). After the 2019 Amendments, the RBI’s power is restricted to debt instruments only; with respect 
to non-debt instruments, for example, equity instruments, the regulatory power now vests in the Central 
Government. 
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Management (Transfer or Issue of Security by a Person Resident Outside India) Regulations 
(commonly referred to as FEMA 20).138 FEMA 20 contained RBI’s regulations on foreign 
investment. From time to time, the RBI also issued Master Directions,139 which compiled 
various instructions issued to Authorised Persons (i.e. persons such as banks who are 
authorized to deal in foreign exchange) on specific regulations, including foreign investment.140  
 
FEMA 20 permitted investment by persons resident outside India subject to certain conditions. 
One such condition was that the investment and any subsequent share transfer transaction 
(between a person resident in India and a person resident outside India) have to conform to 
prescribed pricing guidelines.141 The pricing guidelines were amended from time to time; the 
underlying principle of the pricing guidelines being that the shares, in case of transfer from a 
resident to a non-resident should not be less than their fair market value; and in case of transfer 
from a non-resident to a resident should not exceed the fair market value.  
 
The policy objective behind RBI’s pricing guidelines, particularly in the context of put options, 
is evident from FEMA 20 itself. First, in the definition of “capital instruments” which, under 
FEMA 20, were eligible for investment by a foreign investor. The definition of capital 
instruments, which includes “equity shares”, recognised that such instruments “can contain an 
optionality clause” but should be “without any option or right to exit at an assured price”.142 
Second, a specific “explanation” that was added to the pricing guidelines in case of transfer of 
a capital instrument (e.g. share) from a foreign investor to an Indian party. The explanation 
stated that the “guiding principle” for pricing of the share transfer transaction would be that the 
person resident outside India (i.e. the foreign investor) is “not guaranteed any assured exit price 
at the time of making such investment/ agreement” and “shall exit at the price prevailing at the 
time of exit.”143  
                                                        
138 FEMA 20 was originally framed and notified by the RBI in the year 2000 – “Foreign Exchange Management 
(Transfer or Issue of Security by a Person Resident Outside India) Regulations, May 2000”, as later amended 
from time to time. These regulations were substituted by the Foreign Exchange Management (Transfer or Issue 
of Security by a Person Resident Outside India) Regulations, 2017, FEMA 20(R)/2017-RB (Nov. 7 2017) 
[Henceforth FEMA 20]. 
139 Master Direction is issued under sections 11(1) of FEMA. 
140 For the most recent Master Direction on Foreign Investment – see, RBI/FED/2017-18/60 FED Master Direction 
No.11/2017-18, available at  
https://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/notification/PDFs/MD11_04012018B4D0DB4E6DA04CC4B7AF62AA03D902
BE.PDF [Henceforth Master Direction].  
141 FEMA 20, supra note 138, Reg. 11. 
142 Id. Reg. 2(v), Explanation (a) 
143 Id. Explanation to Reg. 11(3) 
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These provisions in FEMA 20 (notified in November 2017) followed from their predecessor 
regulations (FEMA 20 notified in May 2000, and as amended from time to time). The erstwhile 
FEMA 20 as originally notified in May 2000 did not specifically deal with transfers pursuant 
to put options. However, the regulations mandated compliance with pricing guidelines.144 
These guidelines were notified by the RBI by way of a circular, which set the price for transfer 
of shares at fair market value.145  
 
Restrictions on put options were first specifically imposed by the RBI in December 2013 by 
amending FEMA 20 (as was in effect at the time).146 By this amendment (the 2013 
Amendment), the RBI provided that only shares or convertible debentures “without any 
options/right to exit at an assured price” would be recognised as eligible instruments for 
investment by non-residents under the automatic route (without requiring RBI's prior 
approval).147 These restrictions were further reaffirmed and reiterated by the RBI in 
amendments to FEMA 20 issued on 23 May 2014 which laid down the new pricing 
regulations.148 The new pricing regulations reiterated that a foreign investor could exit under a 
put option clause provided the exit price did not exceed the fair market value. It further added 
that the “guiding principle” would be that the foreign investor is “not guaranteed any assured 
exit price at the time of making such investment/agreements and shall exit at the price 
prevailing at the time of exit.”149 This regulatory approach by way of a guiding principle added 
through the 2014 Amendment was reiterated in the 2017 version of FEMA 20.150  
 
                                                        
144 FEMA 20 (as originally notified by the RBI in May 2000), Reg. 10B(2). 
145 RBI/2004-05/207 – AP (DIR Series) Circular No. 16, 4 October 2004. 
146 Foreign Exchange Management (Transfer or Issue of Security by a Person Resident outside India) (Seventeenth 
Amendment) Regulations 2013, RBI Notification No FEMA 294/2013-RB, 12 November 2013 
147 Reg. 5 of FEMA 20 (as in effect at the time) as amended by the 2013 Amendment. An amendment was also 
carried out to Reg. 9 to provide that a non-resident holding shares or debentures of an Indian company “containing 
an optionality clause” will be permitted to exit but without any assured return. The exit had to be at the fair market 
value calculated in accordance with the specified valuation methodology.  
148 The Foreign Exchange Management (Transfer or Issue of Security by a Person Resident Outside India) 
(Seventh Amendment) Regulations 2014, RBI Notification No FEMA 306/2014-RB, 23 May 2014. 
149 Foreign Direct Investment- Pricing Guidelines for FDI instruments with optionality clauses, A.P. (DIR Series) 
Circular No. 86 (2014) ¶ [2](b) [Henceforth 2014 Amendment]. 
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supra note 140.  The Master Direction, at paragraph 7.8.1 states:  “A person resident outside India holding capital 
instruments of an Indian company containing an optionality clause in accordance with FEMA 20(R) and 
exercising the option/ right, can exit without any assured return” At paragraph 8.3.2, it is provided that “the 
guiding principle would be that the person resident outside India is not guaranteed any assured exit price at the 
time of making such investment/ agreement and shall exit at the price prevailing at the time of exit.” 
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All this while, the mode or methodology of calculating fair market value kept changing.151 
Under FEMA 20 (as notified in November, 2017) the valuation could be done as per any 
“internationally accepted pricing methodology for valuation on an arm’s length basis” duly 
certified by a Chartered Accountant or a Securities and Exchange Board of India registered 
Merchant Banker or a practicing Cost Accountant, in case of an unlisted Indian company.152 In 
case of a listed company (i.e. a company whose shares are quoted on the stock exchange), the 
pricing had to be worked out as per the guidelines prescribed by the Securities and Exchange 
Board of India (SEBI), which is a statutory body that regulates the securities market in India.153 
 
As mentioned above, after the 2019 Amendments to FEMA154 the powers of the RBI and the 
Central Government have been bifurcated. RBI’s power to regulate capital account transactions 
are now limited to “debt instruments” only. For capital account transactions involving non-
debt instruments (such as equity), the regulatory power is given to the Central Government. In 
exercise of this power, the Central Government of India has, in consultation with the RBI, 
notified the Foreign Exchange Management (Non-debt Instruments) Rules, 2019 (Non-Debt 
Rules 2019).155 The Non-Debt Rules 2019 have superseded FEMA 20 which governed the field 
earlier. However, it is not that the Non-Debt Rules 2019 have completely overhauled the 
existing regime. In so far as treatment of put options and pricing rules are concerned, the 
regulatory regime remains the same as it was under FEMA 20. The Non-Debt Rules 2019 
reiterate the earlier position that a foreign investor holding any equity instruments of an Indian 
company containing an optionality clause may, in exercise of the option, exit “without any 
assured return”. The pricing guidelines contained in these new rules continue to retain the same 
valuation methodology and reiterate the same “guiding principle” that “the person resident 
outside India is not guaranteed any assured exit price at the time of making such investment/ 
                                                        
151 In the 2013 Amendment, the valuation methodology was changed to be based on the ‘Return on Equity’. In 
the 2014 Amendment, the methodology for calculation of fair market value was changed to “any internationally-
accepted pricing methodology for valuation of shares on an arm’s length basis, duly certified by a chartered 
accountant or a Security and Exchange Board of India-registered merchant banker.” This is the methodology 
which was followed in FEMA 20 (as notified in November, 2017) and now the extant rules notified in October 
2019 also provide. Prior to these amendments, the regulations required determination of fair market value using 
the Discounted Cash Flow method of valuation. See, amendments carried out to FEMA 20 in April 2010 (RBI 
Notification No FEMA 205/2010-RB, 7 April 2010) and the subsequent circular issued by the RBI in May 2010 
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Affairs), Notification No. S.O. 3732(E) (Oct. 17, 2019) [Henceforth Non-Debt Rules]. 
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agreement and shall exit at the price prevailing at the time of exit”156 (emphasis added by the 
authors). 
 
From the above, it is evident that the RBI, and now the Central Government, while allowing 
put options, continues to keep a tight control on the price at which the put options can be 
exercised. This regulatory approach emanates from concerns, which are understandable, that 
put options of equity securities with guaranteed internal rates of return, as opposed to fair 
market value valuations, would have impermissible characteristics of debt.  The concern with 
non-residents owning and exercising such options arose from requirements governing 
incurrence by residents of “external commercial borrowings”, or “ECB”, which have a number 
of conditions attached to them including end-use restrictions, minimum average maturity, all-
in-cost ceilings, etc.157   
 
As stated above, from a policy standpoint the underlying rationale for the restriction on the 
price payable by the Indian party to the foreign investor under put options was that investors 
should not be guaranteed any assured returns.158 However, a dichotomy arises when put options 
which offer no return and are there only to provide to the foreign investor a downside risk 
protection are also made impermissible. By using the expression “assured exit price” while 
explaining the guiding principle (both under FEMA 20 and under the extant Non-Debt Rules 
2019) the pricing guidelines effectively prevent the exercise of put options where the sale price 
is different from the fair market value of the securities.159 This approach fails to differentiate 
between put options with sale prices guaranteeing assured returns and those that only offer 
downside protection that cap the extent of an investor’s losses without guaranteeing any 
profits.160 The pricing guidelines make it technically impermissible for foreign investors to sell 
their shares at anything above the prevailing stock exchange price in a listed company or, in 
the case of unlisted companies, at a price not exceeding the fair market value. Though the mode 
of calculating fair value has been changed from time to time,161 the implication is the same – 
exit at pre-determined prices remain impermissible. It is in this regulatory backdrop that several 
                                                        
156 Non-Debt Rules, supra note 155, rule 9(5) read with Explanation to rule 21(2)(c)(iii). 
157 External Commercial Borrowings are regulated by guidelines under Foreign Exchange Management 
(Borrowing and Lending in Foreign Exchange) Regulations, 2000. 
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cases regarding the enforceability of arbitral awards based on put option clauses were decided 
by the High Courts and Supreme Court. The following discussion will trace the status of India’s 
foreign exchange laws within the public policy exception and then examine individual cases of 
High Courts.  
 
B. From Renusagar to Vijay Karia: decoupling public policy and foreign exchange 
laws 
 
The Supreme Court decision in Renusagar has been discussed in Part II in light of its 
importance for the interpretation of the public policy exception. The narrow view laid down by 
it continues to be prevalent today to the extent that it has been codified in the Arbitration Act. 
Despite its restrained approach to the public policy exception, Renusagar had held that an 
award whose enforcement would require a violation of India’s foreign exchange laws would 
contravene public policy.162 This portion of the Renusagar ruling was determined by the facts 
of the case and the foreign exchange law in force in India at the time.  
 
General Electric, a company incorporated in New York, entered into a contract with Renusagar 
to supply equipment for a thermal power plant that Renusagar was constructing.163 The contract 
stipulated that Renusagar would pay 10 percent of the consideration through cash or a Letter 
of Credit, the remaining 90 percent was to be paid in 16 installments (each installment 
becoming payable every six months) at an interest rate of 6.5 percent. This contract required 
the approval of the Government of India (as it would entail the outflow of foreign exchange 
through payments to General Electric) which was granted.164 The contract also stipulated the 
reduction of the interest from 6.5 to 6 percent if the Government of India would exempt General 
Electric from paying taxes on the interest paid to it by Renusagar.165 The Government of India 
granted this exemption, but it was withdrawn two years later and cancelled retrospectively; this 
meant that Renusagar had to pay an interest of 6.5 percent on principle amount.166 Renusagar 
approached the Delhi High Court to cancel the Government’s revocation of the exemption.  
Granting Renusagar’s request, the Delhi High Court effectively restored the Government of 
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India’s tax exemption towards General Electric, thus reducing the interest payable by 
Renusagar to 6 percent once again.167 Despite the Delhi High Court’s order, Renusagar did not 
complete the payments of its due installments. Meanwhile, there were some delays from 
General Electric’s side for the supply of equipment. A revised payment schedule was arrived 
at by the parties based on which the capitalized interest was calculated using a longer period 
of time than what was initially decided.168 Both parties agreed to these revised terms but the 
Government of India refused to approve the new payment schedule as it would imply an 
increased outflow of foreign exchange than the original payment schedule.169 Renusagar did 
not make further payments to General Electric and the latter decided to file for arbitration on 
account of not having received the payment installments. The Arbitral Tribunal gave an award 
granting General Electric’s claims.170 
 
The enforcement of the foreign arbitral award was challenged before the Supreme Court on the 
grounds that it contravened India’s public policy by violating its foreign exchange laws. At the 
time, the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 (FERA) was in force.171 The objectives of 
FERA were contained in its Preamble and they were unequivocal in prioritizing the 
conservation of India’s foreign exchange reserves. A country’s right to protect its economic 
interests through the use of foreign exchange laws is a recognized principle in private 
international law,172 and it is also a prevalent practice.173 The Supreme Court in Renusagar  
found that all countries, at some point of their history controlled the flow of their foreign 
exchange to cater to their economic interests;174 for instance, England did this through the 
Exchange Control Act, 1947 (suspended in 1979).175 Informed by this context, Renusagar held 
that any award that would require a violation of FERA would contravene India’s public policy. 
This finding gave the Renusagar court the imperative to examine whether the foreign award 
violated FERA. The Supreme Court found that though the revised payment schedule was not 
approved by the Government of India (which was required under FERA),176 the original 
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payment schedule was approved and Renusagar had defaulted in its installment payments even 
under that schedule.177 Accordingly, the arbitral tribunal had correctly awarded damages to 
General Electric. The Supreme Court also made use of section 47 of FERA which allowed 
damages and debts to be recovered pursuant to a judgment irrespective of the permissibility of 
the recovery under the general scheme of FERA. However, the Government of India needed to 
approve the recovery of a sum through a judgement before it could be remitted.178 The Supreme 
Court noted that the Government’s refusal to approve a revised schedule cannot be assumed as 
a refusal to enforce any judgement relating to the case as well. Based on this reasoning, it held 
that the arbitral award did not violate FERA. Though a violation of FERA would have 
amounted to a contravention of public policy according to Renusagar, no such violation was 
found and this allowed the Supreme Court to enforce the foreign arbitral award.  
 
The portion of the Renusagar award which held that a contravention of India’s foreign 
exchange laws would amount to a violation of public policy has been overruled by the Supreme 
Court through its recent judgment in Vijay Karia v. Prysmian Cavi.179 While the case did not 
directly relate to put options, the Supreme Court used a Delhi High Court decision  on put 
options to substantiate its judgement.180 Vijay Karia dealt with the enforcement of an award 
relating to a call option or the right to require shares to be sold at the sale price.181 Call options 
are the flip side of put options and confer a right to require shares to be sold at the sale price.182 
In Vijay Karia, the foreign investors exercised their right to buy shares of an Indian corporation 
from an Indian shareholder (Vijay Karia) at the discounted price.183 Call options, like put 
options, are also governed by pricing guidelines. The Foreign Exchange (Non-Debt Instrument) 
Rules, 2019184 require that transfers of shares from a resident to a non-resident are made at a 
price that is prevalent in the stock exchange or at an arm’s length price as determined through 
international pricing methodologies by a Chartered Accountant.185 The sale price explicitly 
provided for the sale of shares to Prysiman Cavi at a discount and thus did not meet the 
requirements of the pricing guidelines under the Non-Debt Rules of FEMA.  
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Beyond the permissibility of call options under the Non-Debt Rules, 2019, the rationale behind 
objecting to the exercise of this call option was that lesser foreign exchange would be entering 
the country as the shares were being bought by the foreign investor at a discounted price (the 
sale price). However, the imperative to regulate call options appears to be a less urgent matter 
from a foreign exchange policy perspective as irrespective of the amount, call options bring 
some foreign exchange into the country; this was one of the arguments put forth by Prysmian 
Cavi, the corporation which wanted the arbitral award to be enforced.186 Nonetheless, the 
Supreme Court used this case to examine the validity of the claim that any contravention of 
FEMA would be opposed to the public policy of India.  
 
Referring to Renusagar, the Supreme Court pointed out that the objective of India’s foreign 
exchange laws had changed after the enactment of FEMA. Foreign exchange control under 
FEMA is strict but also permissive. Unlike FERA, there is no provision under FEMA which 
states that any contract that violates the Act will be automatically void.187 Rather, the scheme 
of FEMA allows for violations to be rectified post-facto by seeking permission from the RBI.188 
If a transfer of securities (for instance, through a put option) results in a breach of any FEMA 
regulations, the RBI has the power to condone this breach.189 Thus, impermissible transactions 
under FEMA are not inherently violative of its provisions as they can all be potentially 
permitted by the RBI after they have been carried out.190 Based on this change in India’s foreign 
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exchange regime (from FERA to FEMA), the Supreme Court held that a violation of FEMA 
can never be a ground to refuse the enforcement of a foreign arbitral award.191  
 
The Vijay Karia decision has laid to rest the question of the role of India’s foreign exchange 
laws vis-à-vis the public policy exception. There will always be some amount of uncertainty 
when it comes to the judiciary’s approach, and the NAFED case is evidence of this as it was 
rendered amidst a pro-enforcement ethos in the Supreme Court and High Courts. Whether the 
NAFED decision will be an anomaly or used as grounds to challenge Vijay Karia’s approach 
cannot be conclusively determined at this stage. However, the Vijay Karia decision in addition 
to the 2015 amendment are likely to maintain the pro-enforcement approach in courts for the 
future. Part V provides a detailed analysis of the Docomo case and uses this as a template to 
explain the High Courts’ approach to put options in the context of foreign arbitral awards. 
These High Court decisions are also used to explain the limitations faced by investors despite 
the current pro-enforcement approach taken by the judiciary and establish the urgent need to 
rationalize India’s regulations on put options at the policy level.  
 
V. HIGH COURT DECISIONS: A STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION 
 
A. The Docomo case 
 
The Delhi High Court decision in NTT Docomo Inc. v. Tata Sons Ltd.192 is particularly 
significant because it made a conclusive pronouncement about RBI’s role in the enforcement 
of foreign arbitral awards. The Docomo case dealt with the enforceability of a foreign arbitral 
award made by the London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA).193 NTT Docomo Inc, a 
company incorporated in Japan  (Docomo), and Tata Sons, Ltd. (Tata) and Tata Teleservices 
Limited (TTSL), each incorporated in India, had entered into a Shareholders Agreement (SHA) 
in 2009.194 The SHA outlined the terms of Docomo’s investment in TTSL’s business through 
the purchase of its shares. One of the clauses in the SHA (the sale option clause) provided 
Docomo with an exit option in case TTSL did not meet certain performance indicators 
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prescribed in the SHA.195 The sale option clause was, at the minimum, in the nature of a stop-
loss provision which permitted Docomo an exit while limiting the extent of its losses. As 
described in more detail below, the exit option clause provided that Tata would be required to 
find a buyer for Docomo’s shares at a price equivalent to the fair value of the shares on 7th July, 
2014 or 50 percent of the price at which Docomo purchased TTSL’s shares (the sale price), 
whichever was higher. If Tata could not find a buyer willing to purchase Docomo’s shares at 
the sale price, the clause required Tata to purchase the shares or procure their purchase at any 
price and indemnify Docomo for the shortfall. This clause essentially performed the functions 
of a put option for downside protection but was structured to provide Tata with at least with 
one alternative means to perform its obligations in a manner (by finding a non-resident buyer 
for the Docomo shares) in which the restrictions imposed by the RBI’s pricing guidelines 
would not apply.196  
 
Due to market factors, TTSL was not able to meet the SHA’s performance indicators. 
Consequently, Docomo invoked its right under the sale option clause through a trigger notice 
on 30th May, 2014 and requested Tata  to find a buyer for its shares in TTSL.197 At that time, 
the Tata-determined fair value of Docomo’s shares in TTSL was INR 23.34 per share which 
was substantially lower than the sale price of INR 58.45 per share.198 Upon receiving Docomo’s 
trigger notice, Tata attempted to find a buyer for Docomo’s shares but without success. Tata 
then approached the RBI seeking special permission to remit the price of TTSL’s shares to 
Docomo per the sale option clause i.e., 50 percent of the price Docomo had paid when it had 
initially purchased them. The RBI ultimately denied Tata permission to purchase Docomo’s 
shares at the sale price.199 Unable to reach a resolution through negotiations with Tata, Docomo 
commenced arbitration proceedings before the LCIA on 3rd January, 2015.200  
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In the case before the LCIA, Docomo claimed damages from Tata in lieu of its performance of 
its obligations under the sale option clause. Tata argued that the sale option clause was a 
“waterfall” clause involving different stages of sequential performance.201 This meant that 
Tata’s obligation was a qualified one and would be considered as fulfilled once Tata had 
attempted to fulfill it using the alternative means provided under the SHA. The sale option 
clause contemplated that Tata would first attempt to find a buyer for Docomo’s shares at the 
sale price. If no such buyer was found then Tata could acquire or procure the acquisition of 
Docomo’s share at any price and indemnify Docomo for the remaining amount.202  Tata argued 
that it had tried to find non-resident buyers and then approached the RBI for permission to 
purchase the shares itself.203 These attempts meant that Tata had fulfilled its obligations 
towards Docomo.204  
 
The LCIA was unpersuaded by this reasoning and found in a unanimous decision that the sale 
option clause contained an unqualified and absolute obligation on Tata’s part to secure 
Docomo’s exit at the sale price.205 The LCIA held that the sale option clause  was neither illegal 
under FEMA nor did it require RBI permission to be obtained. Tata was free to find a non-
resident buyer for Docomo’s shares and no RBI approval was required under FEMA for the 
transfer of shares in an Indian company from a non-resident to another non-resident. However, 
no non-resident was willing to purchase Docomo’s shares in TTSL at the sale price given that 
their fair market value was well below such price. Furthermore, no non-resident was willing to 
purchase the shares at any price. Accordingly, the impediment Tata faced in fulfilling its 
obligations under the exit option clause, the LCIA held, was a factual one (inability to find a 
non-resident buyer) and not a legal one.206 The need for RBI permission to enable Tata itself 
to purchase the shares from Docomo and its denial were consequences of this factual 
impossibility and did not affect the validity of the sale option clause or the nature of Tata’s 
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unqualified obligation towards Docomo under it to find a buyer willing to purchase the 
shares.207 Accordingly, Tata was obligated to indemnify Docomo for the full amount of the 
obligation as provided in the contract (of course, if a willing buyer had been found at an amount 
below the floor price, Tata’s indemnification obligation would have been limited to the 
shortfall). The LCIA disagreed with Tata’s “waterfall” analogy and agreed with Docomo’s 
interpretation of the SHA and held that Tata’s inability to fulfill its obligation through the 
alternative routes described would not discharge Tata of these obligations altogether.208 Once 
it was held Tata’s primary obligation (the obligation to find a buyer) was an unqualified one, 
the LCIA held that the question whether a contractual obligation remains enforceable if it is 
subject to a requirement for special permission under the FEMA Regulations does not arise. 
Nor was it necessary for the LCIA to decide whether special permission was required in order 
for Tata to make payment under the indemnity in the sale option clause, or the effect in law of 
RBI's refusal of special permission.209 Based on this reasoning, the LCIA awarded damages to 
Docomo equivalent to the sale price under the exit option clause together with interest. Docomo 
and Tata eventually entered into consent terms based on the award.210  
 
When Docomo approached the Delhi High Court to enforce the LCIA award the RBI filed an 
application to intervene in the case before the court. The RBI disagreed with the LCIA’s 
reasoning and filed an application to be impleaded in the enforcement proceedings before the 
Delhi High Court. Given that Tata had already agreed to comply with the award and had agreed 
on consent terms, the main opposition to the award’s enforcement came from the RBI.211 It 
was argued that the award overlooked FEMA regulations and that because of this, its 
enforcement would be against the public policy of India.212 The High Court rejected the RBI’s 
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argument and found that the award had adequately dealt with the legality of the SHA in the 
context of FEMA regulations and that the arbitral tribunal’s decision would be binding, even 
on the RBI. The case did not require the court to go as far as to explain why the public policy 
exception cannot be invoked solely on the basis of any illegality. This is because the LCIA had 
found, and the court agreed, that the structure of the transaction and the design of Docomo’s 
exit rights did not contravene the RBI’s regulations per se simply because they guaranteed to 
Docomo a minimum assured exit price. The court held that the shareholders’ agreement (SHA) 
between Tata and Docomo “could not be said to be void or opposed to any Indian law including 
the FEMA”.213 The court noted, “FEMA contains no absolute prohibition on contractual 
obligations. It envisages grant of special permission by RBI” and agreed with the LCIA that 
“Clause 5.7.2 of the SHA always was legally capable of performance without the special 
permission of RBI, using the general permission under sub-regulation 9(2) of FEMA 20”214 
which permitted a transfer of shares from one non-resident to another non-resident at any price. 
The court was referring to the reasoning given in the LCIA Award that the put option was 
structured keeping in mind implications under the FEMA. Tata was under an unqualified 
obligation to perform. The LCIA Award held that performance did not necessarily require 
special permission from RBI because certain methods of performance (like Tata finding a non-
resident buyer for Docomo shares) were already covered by general permissions.  
 
Further, the RBI’s case that its permission is required for Tata to transfer any money to Docomo 
was not cognizant of the fact that the award did not enforce the put option per se, rather, it 
awarded damages to Docomo payable by Tata. Accordingly, the question of seeking the RBI’s 
permission did not arise as no such permission is required for the payment of damages.215 The 
court also ruled that “[A]s long as the Award stands, there is no need for any special permission 
of RBI for remission by Tata of the amount awarded thereunder to Docomo as damages. The 
refusal by RBI of such permission which is not required in the first place, or the fact that such 
refusal has not been challenged, would therefore not affect the enforceability of the Award.”216 
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Through this reasoning, the court addressed the RBI’s objection to enforcement based on public 
policy which was premised on the alleged illegality of the SHA and the need for the RBI’s 
permission for Tata to transfer the award amount to Docomo. Thus, the award of damages by 
the LCIA was the necessary element for true enforcement of Docomo’s contractual rights.  
However, this required a litigated outcome. The Delhi High Court also noted that the present 
case had an effect on the goodwill and reputation of Indian entities that entered into contracts 
with foreign entities.217Seeing as the present contract was not entered into under any duress, it 
was in the interest of public policy that the contracting parties be allowed to honor it by the 
judiciary.218  
 
The Delhi High Court took a strict approach to the RBI’s locus standi or basis to intervene in 
the case. Section 48 of the Arbitration Act does not allow for third parties to implead 
themselves when the enforcement of an award is being challenged.219 On the contrary, it 
specifies that only a party in the award which is aggrieved by it has the right to challenge the 
award based on the grounds provided in section 48.220 The RBI was not a party to the award 
and consequently could not use the Arbitration Act as the basis to implead itself. The RBI 
turned to India’s Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) which gives courts the discretion to not 
enforce any compromise that furthers an unlawful objective;221 the RBI was referring to the 
consent terms between Tata and Docomo which it considered unlawful. Notwithstanding the 
High Court’s decision that the award and consent terms were lawful (discussed above), it also 
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held that even the CPC did not contemplate the intervention of a third party in such cases.222 
The CPC only gave courts the discretion not to enforce unlawful compromises but did not 
empower third parties to intervene in these cases.223 Importantly, it held that the RBI could not 
use issues decided by the arbitral tribunal for the basis of its intervention in the present case. 
For instance, the RBI claimed that by virtue of the fact that the case involved money leaving 
India, the RBI had an inherent right to implead itself. The High Court responded to this 
argument by referring to the LCIA decision that had already assessed the role of the RBI in the 
case. Though the RBI was not a part of those proceedings, the High Court noted that it was 
argued by Tata that the RBI’s permission was required for it to comply with the exit option. 
The LCIA had held that there was no need to obtain RBI permission based on the nature of the 
amount awarded (in the form of damages).224 The High Court concluded that the LCIA award 
would bind the RBI as if it were a pronouncement of any civil court: “… RBI will, just as any 
other entity, be bound by an Award interpreting the scope of its powers or any of its regulations 
subject to it being upheld by a Court when challenged by a party to the Award.”225 This is an 
important finding of the Delhi High Court as it deferred to the arbitral authority to not only 
direct the parties in the dispute but to conclusively determine the applicability of their findings 
on statutory bodies such as the RBI.  
 
B. Treatment of downside protection on par with assured returns 
 
The Docomo case was the last of a series of similar decisions rendered by the Delhi High Court 
in 2017. Shakti Nath v. Alpha Tiger226 and Cruz City v. Unitech227 were cases which also 
concerned the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards based on put option clauses and were 
decided by the Delhi High Court just before the Docomo case.  An important difference 
between Cruz City and Docomo is that in the former, the put option agreement was not simply 
for the purpose of downside risk protection but guaranteed an assured return to the investor. 
The put option stipulated that the price at which the foreign investor’s shares are purchased 
must be equivalent to their initial capital commitment and a 15 percent post_tax internal return 
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rate (IRR).228 This was a put option that guaranteed an assured return. Another distinction 
between the two cases is that in Cruz City, the LCIA award did not provide for the payment of 
damages to the foreign investor (Cruz City). Rather it directly enforced the put option requiring 
the respondents (Unitech, an Indian corporation) to pay Cruz City the purchase price of its 
shares against delivery.229 While the LCIA award for Cruz City is not available, a decision of 
the Mauritius Supreme Court (before whom the enforcement of the same award was sought but 
against another party) confirms that the relief in the award was in the form of a direction to 
purchase shares and not an award of damages.230 In Cruz City the Delhi High Court 
acknowledged that the agreement sought to be enforced may be invalid under FEMA but this 
would not be the basis to deny the enforcement of an arbitral award based on the agreement, 
given the narrow scope of section 48.231 The court concluded by stating that Unitech may be 
proceeded against under FEMA as a result of entering into the put option agreement with Cruz 
City, but this cannot be the basis on which it can escape liability under the same agreement.232 
This approach allows foreign investors to use India’s pro-enforcement stance in the context of 
international commercial arbitration to effectively maneuver regulatory uncertainty. However, 
this would be achieved at the cost of the Indian party being made subject to regulatory action. 
Courts in India have not allowed parties to do indirectly what they cannot do directly.233 This 
principle can be equally applied to transactions that are structured around the FEMA 
regulations. While the scope of judicial review is limited in the context of enforcing the arbitral 
award, the same restraint need not be exercised when taking action against the Indian party for 
any regulatory violation.  Thus, the lack of a more nuanced policy on put options not only 
affects foreign investors but also increases the risk faced by Indian parties when they enter into 
agreements that are structured around foreign exchange regulations.    
 
This distinction is important to understand the full scope of an arbitral tribunal’s powers to 
make awards based on put options. In the Docomo case the Delhi High Court did not find the 
award or its enforcement in contravention of public policy, and added that factors such as 
impact on the foreign direct investment inflows and strategic relations between the countries 
where parties are located will have to be kept in mind while examining whether enforcement 
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of an award would be consistent with the public policy of India.234 However, the actual 
enforcement of the LICA award in Docomo did not require any FEMA regulations to be 
violated as the award characterized Tata’s obligation to pay Docomo as damages and not as 
consideration for the transfer of securities.235  Contrastingly, in Cruz City, the High Court was 
dealing with an award which would be impermissible under FEMA but nevertheless decided 
to enforce the award.236 In Shakti Nath the Delhi High Court dealt with a domestic arbitral 
award and an application to set it aside under section 34 of the Arbitration Act. In this case, the 
SHA gave the foreign investor the option to either trigger the put option or claim damages 
under the Indian Contract Act, 1872. The investor had chosen the former and the arbitral award 
provided the relief of damages.237 The arbitral award was challenged for giving effect to a put 
option by disguising its exercise as a claim for damages.  The High Court dismissed this 
challenge and held that in the event of a breach, the contract allowed the investor to exercise 
the put option or claim damages. Given that the claim and arbitral award were for damages, the 
question of RBI approval or their prohibition of put options would not arise in the first place. 
This decision was upheld by the Supreme Court238 and is encouraging for investors as it 
represents a pro-enforcement stance even for domestic-seated arbitration.239   
 
 
VI.  GAPS IN THE CURRENT APPROACH 
 
High Court decisions have made it clear that the judiciary will not intervene in the enforcement 
of arbitral awards even if they contravene provisions of FEMA. While this is a step in the right 
direction, the lack of regulatory certainty has created hurdles for foreign investors who have 
legitimate business interests in managing their investment risks through freely negotiated exit 
rights. Relying on judicial enforcement increases the time taken to exercise put options and 
imposes additional financial strain on the party that loses the case before the arbitral tribunal. 
Even after parties successfully enforce a foreign arbitral award, the freedom with which they 
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can use the proceeds of the award could be limited.  For example, in some cases exit options 
are structured to address FEMA regulations by retaining a portion of award proceeds in India. 
The following discussion explains these implications in detail.   
 
A. Forcing parties into arbitration proceedings 
 
In the context of put options exercisable by foreign investors, the uncertainties created by the 
regulatory regime place Indian residents in a position that drive foreign investors to arbitration 
not only as a dispute resolution mechanism but as a necessity to enforce their contractual rights. 
The severe penal consequences that follow under FEMA for any violation240 prevents an Indian 
party from honoring non-market value-based put options irrespective of whether or not it is 
willing to do so. Litigation then is the safest and perhaps the only means to a resolution. 
However, an award for damages for breach of contract brings with it reputational issues which, 
as the Docomo case has shown, is not a desirable outcome for Indian parties who are ready and 
willing to honor their contractual commitments. This is because the RBI thus far has not 
granted permission to transfer securities to a non-resident for consideration that is incompliant 
with the prescribed pricing guidelines. In the Docomo case, a two-step process was followed 
by the RBI. The RBI first carried out its own evaluation, which was in favor of granting an 
exception, and then made a recommendation to the Ministry of Finance, Government of India, 
which, having the power to take the final call on the request, denied the recommendation.  
 
Based on correspondence cited in the Docomo case, it appears that the RBI is cognizant of the 
difference between put options designed to secure assured returns (as in Cruz City) and those 
designed to reduce downside risk (as in Docomo). When considering Tata’s request to buy 
Docomo’s shares at the sale price, RBI officials had stated that the exit option clause did not 
guarantee an assured return.241 Assured returns are characterized by the investor recovering 
their entire investment plus a certain a return on that investment. Under the sale option clause  
                                                        
240 Section 13 of FEMA prescribes the penalties for violations of the Act and contravention of any rule or 
regulation made thereunder. The amount of any fine could be up to three times the amount involved in the 
violation. Under Section 42 of FEMA, directors and other persons in management of a company in contravention 
of FEMA will be personally liable for the consequences of such violation. Additionally, an entity can be 
investigated by the Enforcement Directorate in connection with any alleged contravention of FEMA, and any 
entity that is under such investigation is rendered ineligible to avail itself of existing general permissions to make 
any investments overseas or provide financial assistance to entities overseas. See, RBI Circular RBI/2003-AP 
(DIR Series) Circular No 41, 6 December 2003; FEMA (Transfer or Issue of any Foreign Security) Regulations 
2004, Regulation 6(2). 
241 Docomo, supra note 27, [45]. 
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the investor was only recovering 50 percent of its own investment; the clause was thus intended 
to provide downside protection and a fair arrangement.242 The RBI was cognizant that a bare 
reading of FEMA regulations would come in the way of enforcing this exit option, however, it 
also noted the importance of India’s strategic relationship with Japan with respect to foreign 
direct investment inflows.243 In conclusion, the RBI had initially found that the request to honor 
the exit option had merit and that it should be granted in this case and future cases having 
similar circumstances.244 When the request was referred to the Ministry of Finance, 
Government of India, it stated that an exception could not be made for one case.245 The Ministry 
of Finance stated that the present FEMA regulations had to be applied to the case. It also 
suggested that if the RBI believed some deviation from the present regulations were warranted 
then it should present a proposal for their change to the Ministry for its consideration.246 It was 
consequent to this communication by the Ministry of Finance that the RBI finally refused 
Tata’s request to transfer money to Docomo for its shares for the pre-determined price under 
the SHA.  
 
Though the present foreign exchange regime is a permissive one as held by the Supreme Court 
in Vijay Karia, permission for transactions are granted based on the discretion of the RBI and 
the Ministry of Finance. The preceding cases have shown that the norm is not to permit such 
transactions even though their fairness has been acknowledged by the RBI.247 This makes the 
exercise of put options without an arbitral award subject to regulatory hurdles unless the put 
option complies with FEMA Regulations.  As seen from Docomo and Cruz City, put options 
                                                        
242 Id.,  [45]. The RBI’s internal correspondence noted that the “intention” behind the regulation was to disallow 
exit with assured return, which was not the case in Docomo. 
243 Id. The RBI stated that “…the larger issue here is of a fair commitment in the contracts in relation to an 
investment and a downside protection of an investment rather than an assured return.  Besides, our strategic 
relationship with Japan in recent times in relation to FDI flows is also a matter to be kept in view.”  Letter of 
Reserve Bank of India to Department of Economic Affairs, Investment Division, Ministry of Finance, dated 
December 22, 2014 (the “RBI Letter”), see LCIA Award, supra note 193, [68]. 
244 Id. [45]-[46]; “In view of this, we are inclined to accept the proposal and in future [sic], in all such cases, 
similar principal [sic] shall be applied.”  RBI Letter. See also, Vijay Sambamurthi, Recent Developments in 
Indian Law: Impact on Private Equity Transactions, 28 NATIONAL LAW SCHOOL OF INDIA REVIEW 44, 48-49 
(2016). 
245 Docomo, supra note 27, [48]-[49]; The Ministry of Finance stated that “[t]he proposal needs to be examined 
by RBI per its extant regulations.  An individual proposal cannot be considered in exception of such 
regulations.”  See LCIA Award, supra note 193, [69]. 
246 Docomo, supra note 27, [48]-[49]. “In case, RBI is of the opinion that the existing regulations need 
modification, a detailed proposal on the subject along with justification and rationale may be forwarded to the 
Government for taking a view in the matter.” 
247 Id. [45]. 
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exist to mitigate an investor’s losses or secure assured returns; investors thus have an incentive 
to exercise put options only when the sale price cannot be obtained through the sale of shares 
at their fair market value. The effect of the pricing guidelines under the erstwhile regulations 
(FEMA 20) framed by the RBI was that put options could operate exclusively in situations 
where put options are least likely to be used by investors. The RBI’s policy, and now the 
Central Government’s Non-Debt Rules, 2019 that continue with that policy, have created an 
avoidable clog in the wheels of international business requiring parties, even when there may 
be no genuine dispute, to arbitrate, obtain an award, and have their rights enforced through the 
judiciary (the High Courts and Supreme Court). Foreign investors may still be willing to invest 
in India and structure transactions to try to address the restrictions. However, from the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Cruz City, it would appear that the party in India will continue to remain 
subject to regulatory action.248  Relying on the judiciary is thus not an optimal solution as it 
increases the cost of enforcing a simple contractual right. Some of the ways in which this 
happens are explained below.249  
 
B. Costs of enforcing put options through arbitration 
 
The first is that it makes the enforcement of a contractual right subject to uncertainty by leaving 
it to arbitration.  Though arbitral tribunals have been allowing foreign investors to benefit from 
put options either directly or through the award of damages, parties should not have to subject 
themselves to this process in the first place. The second issue is that arbitration is a costly 
process. The process of completing the Tata-Docomo dispute (arbitration and subsequent 
enforcement) was expensive; the award of costs in the arbitration alone, as cited in the arbitral 
decision, constituted approximately GBP 120,000 for arbitration costs and over JPY 
1,000,000,000 for other costs.250 And this figure does not include the costs which were incurred 
by Tata. 
 
                                                        
248 Cruz city, supra note 52, [122].  
249 HSA Advocates, RBI On Downside Protection – Are We Set For Course Correction? MONDAQ (Jun. 1, 
2017), https://www.mondaq.com/india/shareholders/598944/rbi-on-downside-protection-are-we-set-for-course-
correction; Radhika Pandey & Bhargavi Zaveri, Policy Implications of the Tata-Docomo Order, BLOOMBERG 
Quint (May 09, 2017), https://www.bloombergquint.com/opinion/policy-implications-of-the-tata-docomo-
order#!/homepage; Makkar & Jain, supra note 13, at 407-08, 413. 
250 Docomo, supra note 27, [20]; Cruz City, supra note 52, [4]. The awarded costs did not include pre-arbitration 
preparation and negotiation costs.  In addition, in the Docomo case, enforcement actions were commenced in New 
York and London in addition to New Delhi, and were stayed pending the Delhi case. 
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The often-cited advantages of arbitration include its ability to provide speedy dispute 
resolution, with confidentiality and at low cost. As seen in the Docomo case, none of these 
tenets are true in large commercial arbitrations.  When one adds the costs of pre-arbitration 
negotiation and preparation (including extensive and voluminous document requests and 
review) and post-award enforcement action, the time and costs involved can significantly 
exceed the award of costs (award of costs usually only cover costs from the time after filing 
through award; post-award interest covers the period after award to payment––the costs of 
enforcement litigation are not included).  Put options are meant to be a tool to manage the risks 
of, and thereby attract, foreign investment by providing for reasonable exit terms. If the cost of 
their enforcement is too high, their use will be restricted only to larger corporations which will 
be able incur such expenses. 
 
In the same vein, companies may have to pay increased damages in the form of interest due to 
delayed regulatory approval or simply due to the length of the proceedings involved to secure 
an arbitral award and then enforce it in India. During the LCIA proceedings, Tata requested 
that the LCIA refrain from providing for the payment of post award interest. This was on 
account of the fact that Tata’s ability to pay the awarded damages was contingent on approval 
from the RBI. The LCIA rejected this contention and only allowed a 21-day grace period, after 
which Tata was required to pay interest on the damages. Not all corporations may be able to 
incur such costs, and regardless of the Indian entity’s relative ability to bear such costs, it is 
certainly not a desirable situation if the dispute could be avoided in the first place.  
 
The third issue relates to the characterization of the relief in the award as damages, and the 
reputational implications for the losing party. A breach of contract and consequent damages 
carries negative associations with it. The implication is that a party was either unwilling or 
unable to honor a contract. When it comes to the current tenuous route to enforce put options, 
this is not necessarily the case. In Docomo, it was the RBI’s refusal to grant permission that 
created the ultimate basis for Docomo to argue non-performance of an obligation by Tata.  
While context will help dispel any adverse implications one may draw from an award of 
damages, there is always an underlying and unnecessary risk posed to a non-performing party’s 
reputation. Finally, even if the RBI and Ministry of Finance were to approve of requests to 
honor put options on a case-by-case basis, the very fact that such approvals are discretionary 
will result in uncertainty. One may legitimately ask whether Tata’s request to purchase 
Docomo’s shares merited the grant of any special permission, especially when the norm was 
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to strictly apply the RBI policy against put options. In the absence of clear and deliberate 
guidelines based on which such discretion would be used, it is difficult to convince investors 
that it will be exercised without any arbitrariness.  
 
C. Remittance – the last yard of enforcement  
 
A review of the High Court decisions conveys the limitations of their pro-enforcement stance. 
High Courts have consistently and unequivocally held that awards based on put option clauses 
ought to be enforced. However, the enforcement of an award does not automatically guarantee 
the freedom to remit the award amount. In Cruz City, the Delhi High Court enforced the arbitral 
award but held that any money recovered from Unitech (the Indian resident) could be remitted 
only after following FEMA Regulations and the pricing guidelines. In a recent case decided by 
the Bombay High Court, Banyan Tree v. Axiom Cordages,251 a pronouncement to this effect 
was made. In Banyan Tree, the put option guaranteed the foreign investor an assured return of 
15 percent when exercised (target value). The Bombay High Court allowed the enforcement of 
the foreign arbitral award providing for the performance of the put option clause, citing 
precedent such as Vijay Karia and Cruz City in its judgement. However, it noted that the put 
option was legal because it stipulated that only the fair value of the shares will be remitted 
through foreign exchange (not requiring special permission of the RBI) and the difference 
between the fair value and target value will be remitted in Indian Rupees to a nominee account 
appointed by the foreign investor, to be used in India.252 In Docomo the requirement of RBI 
permission did not arise ultimately because RBI’s intervention and objections were rejected 
and the award’s relief was in the form of damages, payment of which, as the court held, was 
not prevented under any express provision of FEMA or regulations made thereunder.253 Thus, 
parties’ ability to fully realize the relief granted to them depends on how it is characterized. 
The present policy also reduces investor freedoms. To the extent that parties decide to leave 
proceeds in India for the purpose of complying with FEMA Regulations, it constrains the 
investor’s freedom to use the proceeds as it sees fit. For instance, all the investment in the 
Banyan Tree case was made in US Dollars, but the proceeds were recovered in Indian Rupees 
(amounts constituting interest payments were retained in India to meet RBI pricing 
requirements) and US Dollars (to the extent of the amounts that were remitted outside of India). 
                                                        
251 (2020) SCC Online Bom 781.  
252 Id. [91]. See Kazi & Agarwal, supra note 44. 
253 See supra Part V(A), at 41. 
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Investor freedom is also curtailed when the attempt to work within FEMA Regulations results 
in remittance of put option proceeds to a nominated account in India for use within the country. 
These limitations on the use of proceeds from put options effectively reduce their value and 
consequently their ability to attract foreign investments in India.  
 
The correspondence between the RBI and the Ministry of Finance regarding the Docomo case 
took place in 2014-2015 but no changes were subsequently made to FEMA 20. Rather, they 
have been incorporated by the Central Government in the Non-Debt Rules, 2019 that replaced 
FEMA 20. The recent Supreme Court pronouncement in Vijay Karia and cases such as Banyan 
Tree have renewed discussions on India’s policy towards put options. By removing the blanket 
ban on put options the Central Government and the RBI may be able to better regulate them. 
In the status quo, put options designed for assured returns and downside protection are being 
treated in the same manner. Since the enforcement of these put options will happen through the 
same route, corporations will not be deterred from entering into put options providing assured 
returns. By recognizing (and permitting) downside protection in foreign investment, the 
Central Government and the RBI can differentiate it from assured returns and regulate the two 
practices differently. For instance, proceeds of assured returns could be taxed at a higher rate 
than downside protection in order to disincentivize the former.  
 
Put options are extensively used in India because of a lack of investor confidence, accordingly, 
they play a crucial role in attracting investments in India.254 Downside protection offered by 
put options allow investors to venture into unfamiliar markets with more confidence as the 
extent of their losses will be capped. At the same time, this paper acknowledges the RBI’s 
interest in ensuring the stability of India’s monetary reserves and ensuring that debt instruments 
are not disguised as equity. An investor ought to assume some risk, and this is where the 
distinction between assured returns and downside protection becomes significant. At present, 
it is only the judiciary that seems to recognize the need for Indian residents to uphold their 
contractual obligations to foreign investors. However, when the judiciary enforces put options 
through arbitral awards, it follows a policy of non-interference with the award; meaning that 
                                                        
254 Makkar & Jain, supra note 13, at 412; Shilpa Mankar Ahluwalia & Kushagra Priyadarshani, Enforcing put 





different treatment of downside protection and assured returns is not judicially imposable. 
Rather, the judiciary asserts its doctrinal approach to the issue through holdings that subject 
India’s regulators to the findings of the arbitral tribunals.  Further, despite the pro-enforcement 
trend in the context of commercial arbitration, the fact that investors need to look to arbitration 
and the judiciary and not the other contracting party for the enforcement of their rights in the 
first instance is not emblematic of an investment-friendly environment.  Parties’ desire for a 
neutral venue under neutral rules is a key driver for their decision to initiate arbitration.  
Thereafter, enforcement actions of favorable awards are commenced through courts in India, 
thus relying on the judiciary to enforce the award.  Such courts’ willingness to narrowly 
construe the public policy exception gives foreign investors comfort, but it doesn’t obviate the 




There are clear limitations to the present regime governing the enforcement of put options 
exercisable by foreign investors. The current approach is heavily reliant on foreign arbitral 
awards and their enforcement by courts. While courts have steadfastly enforced these awards 
when required, parties should not have to rely on litigation as a first resort to fulfill contractual 
obligations. Despite the current pro-enforcement stance of Indian courts towards foreign 
arbitral awards, the lack of a responsive regulatory framework poses several challenges to 
foreign investment.  These include high costs of litigation and the inability to remit proceeds 
of the put option outside India, unless structured as an award of damages. Irrespective of 
whether an investment is structured as providing for an assured return or downside protection, 
in order to realize the full amount and use it outside India, it would have to be characterized as 
damages by the foreign arbitral award. In cases where the award does not characterize the 
awarded amount as damages, the party desiring to enforce the award would have to retain any 
amount above fair market value in India. In order to increase investor freedom and confidence, 
India will need to rationalize its policy towards downside protection of foreign investment 
through put options in order to increase investor confidence. The RBI seemed to have been 
inclined to allow put options guaranteeing downside protection. Given this inclination, the RBI 
should persuade the Central Government to leverage the present judicial momentum and frame 
a more nuanced regime governing optionality clauses; one that distinguishes between assured 
returns and downside protection.  
 
